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Abstract
Monetary policy is usually modelled as either simple rules or optimal policy. While the
former are often seen as incomplete and unrealistic for practical policymaking, the latter
can yield catastrophy should the policymakers macroeconomic model be wrong. I seek to
"robustify" the optimal policy from Norges Banks reference model, NEMO, when there
are alternative possible models with very di¤erent structural properties. This is done by
punishing deviations from a simple interest rate rule in a "modied" welfare loss function. I
consider several simple rule for this purpose, among them the simple Taylor rule and several
rules that are optimized for the alternative models. The combination of optimal policy and
simple rules turn out to be e¤ective for avoiding large welfare losses in the alternative models
and creating an acceptable trade-o¤. In addition, the method is exible and can easily be
implemented by central banks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and summary
Uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it
is the dening characteristic of that landscape (Greenspan 2003).
As the quote from former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan emphasizes, the prac-
tice of monetary policy is surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. While the previous
decades have seen great advances in the modelling of short run macroeconomic uctuations,
researchers and practitioners alike have not landed on one single model or even a single type
of models. Di¤erent assumptions about issues such as which shocks drive aggregate uc-
tuations, how wages and prices are set on the micro level, the nature of capital formation,
and the degree of competition in markets can lead to very di¤erent conclusions about how
the economy functions on the macro level. This in turn leads to varying prescriptions for
monetary policy.
In this thesis I investigate how monetary policy in Norway can be made robust to uncer-
tainty about the functioning of the economy. In most developed countries today, monetary
policy is determined by an independent central bank that controls the short term nominal
interest rate1. The most important objectives are a low and stable ination rate and the sta-
bilization of output around a trend. These goals can be expressed by means of a quadratic
welfare loss function. In the monetary policy literature, the interest rate is often modelled
as a rule that specify feedback from certain macroeconomic variables (such as ination and
the output gap) to the rate. The optimal policy is the rule that minimizes the loss function
given the constraints of the model. A simple instrument rule, by contrast, is based only on
a limited subset of information and will not in general implement the optimum. The advan-
1In the following, I take the terms central bank and policymaker to mean the same things. I disregard the
details of the decision-making process. In Norges Bank, the key policy rate is the sight deposit rate, which
is the interest rate on private banksdeposits in the central bank. This rate is set by the Executive Board,
which consists of two inside (full-time) and ve outside (part-time) members.
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tage of simple rules is that they have been found to be more robust to uncertainty about the
structure of the economy; that is, when the policymaker does not have complete condence
in any single model, simple rules can provide an insurance that optimal policy can not (Levin
and Williams 2003; Taylor and Williams 2010).
I assume that the policymaker has one reference model, but lacks complete condence in
this specication. Instead, he also considers three alternative models that have very di¤erent
structural properties. Thus I depart from the common robust control framework, which
assumes that the alternative models are all varieties of  and are hard to distinguish from
 the reference (Hansen and Sargent 2008). My reference model is the Norwegian Economy
Model (NEMO), a medium scale, open economy new Keynesian model that is Norges Banks
main model for monetary policy analysis. The set of alternative models consists of a version of
NEMO that includes a nancial accelerator mechanism through the e¤ect of house prices on
credit (Credit NEMO); a smaller scale new Keynesian model with incomplete pass-through of
exchange rate uctuations (LGM); and a macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy
that is distinguished from the other three models in that it assumes neither forward-looking
agents nor general equilibrium (NAM). I re-estimate LGM on Norwegian data.
While NEMO is the policymakers main model and therefore the point of departure for
evaluating monetary policy, this policy should also yield a reasonably good outcome if one of
the alternative models actually provides a better description of reality. I seek to "robustify"
the optimal policy rule in NEMO by striking a compromise: the chosen rule should be close
to the optimal policy in NEMO only to the extent that this does not lead to too high welfare
losses in the other models. This is achieved by using a simple instrument rule as a "cross-
check" on the optimal policy. I follow Ilbas et al. (2012) in using a modied loss function
to operationalize the preference for robustness. In addition to the standard terms, this loss
function penalizes departures from a simple rule. It should not be taken as representing the
true preferences of the policymaker, but rather as a means for making the optimal policy
robust to model uncertainty. By increasing the weight given to the simple rule relative to
stabilization of NEMO, we will get a policy that is closer to the simple rule. Thus a main
issue is to nd a simple rule and a weight on this rule in order to get a reasonable compromise
between a low welfare loss in NEMO and robustness to model uncertainty.
For the optimal NEMO policy to be implementable in the alternative models, I must
approximate it with what I call an implementable instrument rule that includes only variables
present in all of the models. I nd that an eight parameter specication provides a reasonably
good specication. I consider three types of simple rules as cross-checks in the modied
loss function. First, the simple Taylor rule (Taylor 1993), which is well known and widely
considered to be robust to model uncertainty. Second, simple Bayesian rules that minimize an
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average of the losses in each of the alternative models. Third, a minmax rule that minimizes
the maximum loss across all the alternative models. The Taylor rule provides a benchmark
that the optimized rules can be compared to.
The main problem with the optimal NEMO policy is that it creates instability in NAM.
Even a low weight on the ad hoc Taylor rule in the modied loss function can provide
insurance against this scenario, and the resulting policy rule will generate acceptable losses
in all the models. However, adding some inertia in the interest rate and optimizing over the
coe¢ cients in the rule gives better performance. The three parameter Bayesian rule and the
minmax rule outperform the Taylor rule in terms of the minimum weighted loss across all
the models. There are two main di¤erences. First, the optimal weight on the simple rule
should be higher for the optimized three parameter rules. Second, the models are more "fault
tolerant" with respect to the choice of weight, in the sense that the losses are acceptable for
a wider range of values of this weight. I nd that it is possible to robustify optimal policy in
the reference model by means of the modied loss function and a simple, robust rule. The
approach is both exible and implementable, and thus it can be recommended for practical
policymaking.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2 the four models are described.
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 have been written by Maria Brunborg Hoen. Chapter 3 provides the
theoretical background to the issues of optimal policy, simple rules and robustness. In section
3.1 I show how the exible ination targeting regime can be operationalized by means of a
welfare loss function. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 contrast optimal monetary policy with the use
of simple instrument rules, and I discuss the relative merits of the two approaches. Section
3.4 discusses the alternative approaches to robustness in the literature, and I introduce my
method and the reasoning behind it. Chapter 4 contains the results. First, in section 4.1
I show how the optimal state-contingent NEMO policy can be approximated by an imple-
mentable intrument rule. Section 4.2 introduces the setup for my simulations as well as two
measures of performance: excess loss and implied ination premium. Section 4.3 contains
the main results from the robustication of optimal policy, while a summary is provided in
section 4.4. The equations that constitute NEMO, NAM and LGM are given in appendix A.
I employ the Dynare software platform for estimation and simulation of the models as well
as calculation of optimal policy. Dynare is an open source program developed to handle a
wide range of economic models, in particular DSGE models with rational expectations. The
algorithm for nding optimal simple rules has been developed by Junior Maih for Norges
Bank2. Dynare runs in Matlab, in which I have also done other calculations.
2Dynare can be downloaded from http://www.dynare.org/. The OSR algorithm is not publicly available.
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Chapter 2
The models
2.1 DSGE models and new Keynesian economics
Of the four models I consider in this thesis, one (NAM) is a completely backward-looking
model, while the rest are dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The latter
are dynamic models of the macroeconomy based on agents solving intertemporal optimization
problems and the assumption that all markets clear in each period. In addition, there is some
aggregate uncertainty in e.g. total factor productivity or government policy generated by
exogenous, stochastic shocks. The term "DSGE model" comprises a wide variety of models,
however, from the simplest real business cycle (RBC) perfect competition models to new
Keynesian models with short run nominal rigidities.
2.1.1 A simple new Keynesian model
In most of these models, the demand side consists of a representative consumer who max-
imizes the discounted sum of future utilities from consumption and leisure, subject to a
sequence of ow budget constraints. He is allowed to invest in a risk-free pure discount bond
that pays a time-varying interest rate. Optimization leads to a consumption Euler equation,
which in its simplest log-linearized form can be written:
ct = Etct+1   (it   Ett+1) (2.1)
where ct is (log) consumption, i t the nominal interest rate and t the ination rate. Con-
sumption smoothing means that consumption today will move with expected consumption
tomorrow, and a higher real interest rate  by increasing the pay-o¤ from saving relative to
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consuming  leads to less consumption today.
The simplest RBC models  such as the one analyzed by Gali (2008: ch. 2)  are not
well tted for policy analysis. In these perfect competition models, rms maximize prots for
given prices and wages. As a result, prices are perfectly exible even in the short run, and all
real variables  even the real interest rate  are determined by non-monetary fundamentals.
This implies that any change in the policy rate is perfectly o¤set by a change in the ination
rate. Monetary policy is e¤ective in determining ination, but it has no impact on the real
variables that determine welfare.
This is changed when we allow for nominal price rigidities, as prices will no longer follow
interest rates in the short run. New Keynesian models preserve the dynamic general equi-
librium framework of RBC theory while abandoning the assumption of perfect competition
in order to provide microfoundations for nominal rigidities (Dixon 2008). The source of this
rigidity might vary, but usually there is some restriction on how rms set prices. The com-
mon Calvo pricing mechanism (Calvo 1983) is used in LGM and many other new Keynesian
models. Each monopolistic rm sets the price for its own good, but is only allowed to do
so when it receives a random signal. There is a xed probability that any rm is allowed to
change its price in any given period, which results in a constant average number of periods
between re-optimizations. This kind of rigidity on the supply side creates a role for mone-
tary policy in stabilizing both prices and output; changes in the short term interest rate are
not matched one-for-one by changes in expected ination, and so the policymaker is able to
inuence the real interest rate.
Gali (2008: ch. 3) derives a simple closed economy new Keynesian model which has a
demand side described by the Euler equation above and a supply side characterised by Calvo
price setting and monopolistic competition among a large number of rms. This model
serves as the basis for the more complicated models that I employ in this thesis. There
is a continuum of rms, each supplying a di¤erentiated good and seeking to maximize the
discounted market value of its prots. Due to the Calvo restriction on pricing, they choose
a price equal to a markup over a weighted average of expected future marginal costs, the
weights being proportional to the probability that the price will remain the same at each
future date. When aggregating across all rms, ination can be expressed as the discounted
sum of expected deviations of average marginal cost from the steady state value:
t = 
1X
k=0
tEt fcmct+kg (2.2)
When average marginal costs are expected to be above their long run (steady state) level,
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rms that are allowed to reset their prices now will set higher prices than the current average,
as they take into account future costs. Thus prices will rise today. Now, marginal costs are
proportional to output. Taking into account that the underlying, exogenous technological
progress is the same whether prices are perfectly exible or not, the marginal cost gap can
be expressed in terms of the di¤erence between actual output and "potential" (or "natural")
output in logs, which is called the the output gap. We get the following relation between
ination today, next periods ination rate and the output gap yt, called the new Keynesian
Phillips curve:
t = Et ft+1g+ yt + t (2.3)
where t is a cost-push shock that is often added to the Phillips curve in an ad hoc manner. All
shocks in the models I consider in this thesis are normally distributed, serially uncorrelated
and independent.
Assuming clearing of the goods market and using the Euler equation 2.1, we get the
dynamic IS equation:
yt = Etyt+1   (it   Ett+1   rnt ); (2.4)
where rnt is the natural real interest rate, which is determined by technological changes.
Adding an equation that determines the interest rate it, we get a three equation system that
constitutes a benchmark new Keynesian model on log-linearized form.
2.1.2 General form and stability conditions
Most linearized DSGE models can be written compactly on the following general form (Blan-
chard and Kahn 1980; Svensson 1999):
"
Xt+1
Etxt+1
#
= A
"
Xt
xt
#
+Bit + CZt, (2.5)
where Xt is a column vector of variables that are predetermined at time t, xt is a column
vector of variables that are non-predetermined, it is the interest rate (for now treated as
exogenous), A, B and C are parameter matrices, and Zt is a column vector of exogenous
shocks realized at time t. A variable that is predetermined at time t is a function only of
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variables known at time t, so that EtXt+1 = Xt+1 (Blanchard and Kahn 1980). A variable
that is non-predetermined at time t can depend on any variable that is not realized before
time t. In the case of a completely backward-looking model such as NAM, xt is the zero
vector, and the model is then a simple system of stochastic di¤erence equations expressed
in matrix form. The general form given by equation 2.5 can also accomodate models that
contain variables either lagged more than one period or with expectations of variables more
than one period ahead. This is achieved simply by dening new variables in the system.
The canonical New Keynesian model presented above can be written on the form of equa-
tion 2.5. Assume for simplicity that rnt = vt, a normally distributed and serially uncorrelated
shock. In this model, both yt and t are non-predetermined at t. Thus the model is written:
"
Ett+1
Etyt+1
#
=
"
1

 

 

1 + 

#"
t
yt
#
+
"
0

#
it +
"
  1

0


 
#"
t
t
#
(2.6)
Adding an equation for it, such as the simple Taylor rule (see section 3.3), allows us to solve
the system in equation 2.5 by standard methods developed for linear rational expectations
models (e.g. Blanchard and Kahn 1980; King andWatson 1998). The termBit then vanishes,
and instead we have a new matrix A0 in front of the vector of time t endogenous variables.
As shown by Blanchard and Kahn (1980), a necessary condition for a unique non-explosive
solution to the system is that the number of eigenvalues of A0 with modulus greater than one
is equal to the number of non-predetermined variables. If there are more eigenvalues outside
the unit circle than non-predetermined variables, there can be only explosive solutions. An
example of such a situation is one where monetary policy is unable to contain ination
expectations, such that expectations of ever higher ination are self-fullling. If the number
of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is less than the number of non-predetermined variables,
on the other hand, there are innitely many solutions. In the following, the former situation
is called instability, the latter indeterminacy. In new Keynesian models, monetary policy is
typically vital for bringing about a unique, stable solution.
2.2 NEMO
The Norwegian Economy Model, NEMO (Brubakk et al. 2006), is a New Keynesian DSGE
model used by Norges Bank for policy evaluation and forecasting . It is a model of a small
open economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign, interpreted as Norway and
its trading partners, and two sectors, one producing intermediate goods and one producing
a single nal good. The model economy is a representation of the Norwegian mainland
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economy, with the petroleum sector entering as an exogenous process for oil investments.
The foreign economy is modelled symmetrically to the home economy, but enter in the
form of exogenous variables, such that Norway has no inuence on its trading partners. All
variables in NEMO are detrended with a common stochastic growth trend. We use a rst-
order Taylor approximation of the model. All variables except growth rates and interest rates
are expressed in log deviations from the respective (log) steady state values.
The economy consists of a continuum of innitely lived households that are divided into
two types, "savers" and "spenders", who both supply labour services to the intermediate
goods sector. The share slc of spenders are rule-of-thumb consumers who spend their total
labour income every period. The share (1   slc) of savers have access to the credit market
and choose consumption and saving plans that maximize expected utility over the lifetime
subject to a budget constraint, which leads to the following Euler equation:
csat = f191Etc
sa
t+1 + f192c
sa
t 1   f193Et fit   t+1g   f194Zt + f195zUt (2.7)
where csat is the saversconsumption, 
Z
t is a shock to the growth trend and z
U
t is a preference
shock that raises the marginal utility of consumption relative to leisure. Savers are forward-
looking and wish to smooth consumption over time, and due to habit persistence, current
consumption also depends on last periods consumption. A temporary rise in growth reduces
the value of (detrended) consumption, and households thereby postpone consumption.
The savers invest in domestic and foreign bonds, receive all dividends from rms, pay
lump sum taxes and set nominal wages taking rms labour demand into account. They
have some degree of monopoly power in the labour market, and hence the resulting wages
are above the competitive wages. Spenders receive the average wage rate of the savers and
simply supply the amount of labour demanded at this wage. There are quadratic costs of
adjusting wages that make wage growth, wt , respond sluggishly to shocks. This variable thus
depends on past and future wage growth, deviations of the actual wage from the optimal wage
(equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure), (wt  mrst),
and the degree of bargaining power represented by the substitution elasticity between labour
inputs, !t:
Wt =

1 + 
Et
W
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Wt 1   f231(wt  mrst)  f232!t (2.8)
Figure 2.1 shows the structure of NEMO. Production of the nal good, A, is done using
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a combination of imported and domestically produced intermediates, respectively M and Q,
with the shares being given by the degree of "home bias", i.e. the relative preferences for input
factors produced in the home economy. The nal good is used for consumption, C, capital
investments in the intermediate sector, I, government spending, G, and oil investments, IOIL.
The only source of imports in the economy are the imported intermediate goods, T*, and
exports consist purely of domestically produced intermediate goods, M*.
Figure 2.1: An overview of the production structure in NEMO (Brubakk et al. 2006).
In the intermediate goods sector, monopolistically competitive rms produce di¤erenti-
ated goods tt, utilizing capital services, kt = ut+kt 1 Zt , and labour in a constant elasticity
of substitution production function:
tt = f61(lt + z
L
t ) + f62kt; (2.9)
where zLt is a labour augmenting productivity shock that temporary increases the level of
production.
The amount of capital services depends on the capital stock and the utilization rate,
whereas the stock itself is determined by depreciation and investments done one period
earlier. There are convex adjustment costs of changing both the level of the investment
to capital ratio, (invt   kt 1), and the rate of change in this ratio. Together with variable
capital utilization and habit persistence, these costs make up the real rigidities in NEMO. The
investment to caital ratio is thus a slowly moving variable that reacts positively to increases
in the expected real return to capital, EtrKt+1, and negatively to the expected real interest
rate, which reduces the discounted value of returns. A somewhat simplied version of the
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investment Euler equation can be written
invt   kt 1 = f111(invt 1   kt 2) + f112Et finvt+1   ktg (2.10)
 f113Et

(it   t+1)  f114rKt+1
	
+ shockinvt
Intermediate rms set prices as a markup above the competitive price, and prices respond
sluggishly to shocks due to convex adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982). Intermediate
goods ination, Qt , increases with real marginal costs and decreases with a cost push shock
represented by the substitution elasticity between the domestically produced intermediate
goods, Ht :
Qt =

(1 + )
Et
Q
t+1 +
1
(1 + )
Qt 1 + f131(mct   pQt )  f132Ht (2.11)
Prices on the exported factor inputs are set in the local currency at the destination where
they are sold, and they evolve in a similar way to domestic intermediate prices. Foreign
intermediate good producing rms set domestic prices in an identical way to domestic rms,
so imported ination is governed by a corresponding Phillips curve.
The real exchange rate, st, is governed by a version of the standard uncovered interest
rate parity (UIP) condition1. In optimum, the expected returns on domestic and foreign
bonds must be equal. There is also an exogenous risk premium zBt , of which a positive
realization means that the return to foreign bonds relative to domestic bonds increases, i.e.
that foreigners demand a higher real return for a given exchange rate:
st = f201Etst+1   Et fit   t+1g+ Et

it   t+1
	
+ zBt (2.12)
The government purchases nal goods nanced through a lump-sum tax, invests in the
petroleum sector and sets the short term nominal interest rate. Government spending and oil
investments are exogenous variables. The other exogenous variables include domestic shock
processes and all the foreign variables except export prices (i.e. Norwegian import prices).
These are all modelled as AR(1) processes with normally distributed white noise shocks "t:
zt = zt 1 + "t (2.13)
1Note that the real exchange rate is denoted by the letter q in LGM.
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The model is closed by assuming market clearing for the nal good, the intermediate
good, labour, and domestic bonds. I use the estimated version of NEMO that was used for
the analyses in Norges Banks Monetary Policy Report no. 3, 2011 (Norges Bank 2011)2.
2.3 Credit NEMO
Credit NEMO is an extension of the benchmark version of NEMO with a credit market
explicitly modelled as a separate sector producing houses (Brubakk and Natvik 2010). It
builds on the models by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and
Neri (2010) in which credit markets are included in otherwise standard DSGE models in
order to incorporate e¤ects from asset prices and credit constraints to the real economy. The
housing sector in Credit NEMO is endogenous  in contrast to a xed real estate amount
in Iacoviello (2005)  such that housing investments and production are additional driving
forces of the economy.
The housing sector in Credit NEMO uses the nal good as input and has a lower pro-
ductivity growth than the rest of the economy; this is consistent with the observed upward
trend in the relative price of housing to other goods. All variables are detrended with their
respective long run growth rates. The housing stock depreciates over time and is increased
by new investments. House prices evolve according to the productivities in the housing and
intermediate goods sectors, to the level of and change in the investments to housing stock
ratio, and a housing investment shock. In addition to the shocks in NEMO, there are three
housing shocks (to housing demand, housing productivity and the loan-to-value ratio) that
contribute noticeably to the variance of endogenous variables.
Households exhibit habits in housing consumption, and the housing services enter directly
into their utility function. They are divided into two groups, patient and impatient, where
the latter are credit constrained and by assumption only borrow a given share of the value of
their housing stock (Iacoviello 2005). This loan-to-value ratio is exogenously given and set
to 0.93. Impatient households earn labour income and borrow from the patient households.
Only patient households have access to a foreign bonds market where they can borrow to
nance consumption, housing services and lending to impatient households. Borrowing is
in zero net supply, and the total stock of housing is divided between impatient and patient
households, with shares equal to their income shares.
2In the version used for this report, some of the price setters are assumed to be completely backward
looking (non-optimizing). I set this share to zero, however, as I want to use the estimated model.
3Until recently Norwegian house buyers had to self-nance minimum 10 percent of the price, such that
a 90 percent loan-to-value ratio seems reasonable. The required self-nance share has been increased to 15
percent, however.
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The intermediate sector is modelled as in the benchmark version of NEMO, but with two
types of labour, supplied by patient and impatient workers. Total labour input is a Cobb-
Douglas function of the hours worked by the two types. Intermediate rms choose prices and
factor inputs in order to maximize the expected cash ow.
By relaxing the assumption of homogeneity among households and incorporating a chan-
nel from balance sheet positions to agents decisions, Credit NEMO is able to capture a
nancial accelerator e¤ect in which shocks that inuence house prices are amplied and
propagated through the e¤ects on consumption and housing demand. Two mechanisms con-
tribute to this nancial accelerator: one wealth e¤ect through higher consumption when asset
prices increase, and one indirect balance sheet e¤ect. The latter results from a higher value
of the accessible credit of impatient households, which drives up their demand for housing
services and consumption.
Because we want to focus on di¤erences in how the domestic economy is modelled, we let
the foreign variables in Credit NEMO develop according to the same AR(1) processes as in
the benchmark version of NEMO.
2.4 LGM
2.4.1 Description of the model
The Leitemo-Gali-Monacelli (LGM) model is an open economy small scale new Keynesian
DSGE model stemming from the work of Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli (2006).
Our version is closer to the one developed and estimated by Leitemo (2006). It shares many
features with the canonical new Keynesian model for open economies (Galí and Monacelli
2005; Galí 2008), but it includes more realistic open economy aspects by allowing for incom-
plete pass-through of exchange rate movements to import prices. This creates a source of
frictions in addition to the standard ones in the canonical model, and it is more consistent
with data (Monacelli 2006). In addition, the model allows both expected future ination and
previous periodsination to determine ination and output today.
The core of the model is constituted by four equations: two Phillips curves for domestic
and imported ination, respectively, an IS curve governing output gap movements, and an
equation for the real exchange rate. The domestic economy is populated by a representative
agent who chooses consumption, savings and labour supply in order to maximize discounted
utility given his budget constraint. There are complete international markets for state con-
tingent assets, such that consumers in all countries can invest in the same assets. This
assumption pins down the relationship between domestic consumption, foreign consumption
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and the terms of trade. The household consumes an aggregate of domestic and imported
goods. The domestic good is in turn an aggregate of a continuum of goods, each produced
by a monopolistic rm that wants to set price as a markup over marginal costs in order to
maximize current and discounted future prots. However, prices are set in the Calvo (1983)
manner. This leads to some price stickiness, as rms are not able to translate marginal cost
changes into price changes without a delay. In contrast to NEMO, however, there are no
frictions associated with wage setting, and the wage is not explicitly modelled. There is
also no nal good producer; the imported and domestic goods are consumed directly by the
household.
While in NEMO foreign exporters set prices for their products in Norwegian currency
(local currency pricing), imported intermediary goods in LGM are priced by a seperate,
domestic imports sector that takes prices on the world market as given and then set the
domestic price. These rms need to take into account that when prices are sluggish, exchange
rate movements lead to deviations of the world price (in domestic currency units) from local
market prices. This di¤erence is called the law of one price (LOP) gap, given by
 Ft = et + p

t   pFt = et + pt   pt   (1  )

pFt   pHt

(2.14)
= qt   (1  )st;
where et is the nominal exchange rate, pt is the world price in foreign currency, p
F
t is the
imported goods price (in domestic currency), qt is the real exchange rate,  is the share of
imported ination in CPI ination, and st = pFt   pHt is the terms of trade. When  Ft is
large, ination rises as importers seek to raise local prices in order to get them in line with
the price they face in the world market. Due to price-setting frictions, the LOP gap will not
be closed instantly, and this leads to incomplete short run pass-through.
In order to make the model more realistic, we do some changes to the core structure
outlined above. First, we follow Leitemo (2006) in allowing for a more gradual adjustment of
prices and output. This can be explained by information and implementation lags due to e.g.
rule-of-thumb pricing and habit formation in consumption. We allow for four lags of ination
in the two Phillips curves and two lags of the output gap in the dynamic IS equation.
Second, we depart from Leitemos specication of a standard UIP condition by allowing
for a more gradual development of the real exchange rate. The real exchange rate depends
partly on the expectations of next quarters rate and partly on the previous quarters rate.
It follows the equation
13
qt = (1  )Etqt+1 + qt 1   (iq;t   Etq;t+1) + (iq;t   Etq;t+1) +  t; (2.15)
where iq;t and 

q;t+1 are the foreign interest rate and ination rate, respectively,  t is a shock,
and all variables are in quarterly terms.
Third, the forward component of the Phillips curves consists of expectations of only next
periods ination rate, not the whole year ahead. This is in line with both Monacellis (2006)
specication and the canonical representation from the literature (e.g. Galí 2008). However,
the decisions are subject to a one quarter implementation lag, meaning that the previous
quarters expectations of future variables determine this quarters variables.
We calibrate the share of imported ination in CPI ination to  = 0:4, which is higher
than the value used by Leitemo (2006). There are two reasons for this change. First, the Nor-
wegian economy is more open than the British, which means that imported goods constitute
a larger fraction of total consumption and production. Second, the value 0:4 corresponds
roughly to the share of imported intermediate goods in production of the nal good in
NEMO4.
Foreign variables  the interest rate, ination and the output gap  are modelled as
in NEMO, using estimated AR(1) processes for each variable. Since we want the foreign
economy to be identical across models, we keep the parameter values for the persistence
coe¢ cients from NEMO, but estimate the standard deviation of the shocks. For estimation
purposes (but not for later simulations), we close the model by specifying a simple interest
rate rule that includes current ination, the current output gap, and one lag of the interest
rate.
2.4.2 Estimation
The model is estimated as a system using Bayesian methods. This allows us to incorporate
prior information regarding the parameter values and in this way avoid the "absurd" values
that can result from maximum likelihood estimation when the model is misspecied (An and
Schorfheide 2007). By weighting the likelihood function by a prior density, information not
contained in the sample used for estimation can be included in the estimation process.
The Bayesian framework means that we must specify prior probability distributions that
reect our beliefs prior to estimation about the parameters to be estimated. As prior mean
values we use the estimates that Leitemo (2006) obtains with data from the United Kingdom.
4Furthermore, our calibration corresponds to that which Monacelli (2006) nds to be reasonable for a
small open economy.
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We specify normal distributions for most parameters, but use the beta distribution for those
constrained to lie between zero and one. We estimate the standard deviations of eight
Gaussian shocks (error terms) and use the inverse gamma  which restricts them to be
positive  as the prior distribution.
The monetary policy rule is a three parameter rule that includes ination, the output gap
and the lagged interest rate. It has the form
it = it 1 + t + yyt; (2.16)
where t is the year-on-year ination rate. The prior mean values of  and y in this equation
are based on the standard Taylor rule, but we include a considerable degree of interest rate
smothing ( = 0:75) consistent with the stated objectives of Norges Bank (see section 3.1).
The standard deviations of shocks in the AR(1) processes for foreign variables are described
by the beta distribution, and the mean values are the estimated values from NEMO. We
impose some linear restrictions on the parameters. First, the sum of the coe¢ cients on
forward and backward terms in the two Phillips curves and in the output equation should
sum to one. Second, the sum of the e¤ects of all the lags in the Phillips curves are also
restricted to one, i.e.
4X
j=1
j =
4X
j=1
j = 1: (2.17)
We use eight data series for the period 1993:Q4-2011:Q2, which is the period used for
estimating NEMO. All data are observed at a quarterly frequency and have been obtained
from Norges Banks Datawarehouse. The eight data series used for estimation are reported
in appendix A.3, table A.1. These are for the most part the same as those used for estimation
of NEMO. We transform the observable variables in a way that is consistent with the model
variables being log-linearized around the steady state and that there is no long run growth in
the model. To create the output gap from the series for GDP per capita, we use the Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) lter with a smoothing parameter  = 16000. This is ten times the value
originally proposed and most commonly used for US quarterly data (Hodrick and Prescott
1997). The reason for choosing this value is that it creates a smoother trend and thus more
volatile cycles, thought to t the Norwegian economy better. We also use this ltering for
the real exchange rate, as we nd a clear downward trend in this variable thoughout the
data period. Such de-trending makes the observable variables consistent with the model. In
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addition, all variables are demeaned prior to estimation.
The model is estimated in Dynare. First we obtain an approximation of the mode of
the posterior distribution. Then we construct a Gaussian approximation of this distribution
around the mode using a Metropolis-Hastings Markov Chain Monte Carlo optimization rou-
tine. The routine makes 500:000 draws from the distributions  half of which are discarded
 and runs two parallel chains. We use the mean of these distributions as point estimates
of the parameters. Priors and results of the estimation are reported in appendix A.3, table
A.2.
2.5 NAM
The Norwegian aggregated model (NAM) is a quarterly macroeconometric model devel-
oped specically for the Norwegian economy by Bårdsen and Nymoen (2001), Bårdsen et al.
(2003), and Bårdsen (2005). The version used in this thesis is the one documented in Bårdsen
and Nymoen (2009). As opposed to the other models we consider, it does not assume that
the economy is a system in general equilibrium, and no forward-looking rational agents are
modelled. Instead, di¤erent parts of the economy are modelled separately, relying partly on
theory and partly on data to identify the relevant variables in each equation. The model
is formulated in error correction form. First, starting from a general vector autoregression
(VAR), cointegrating relationships between variables in levels are identied. These describe
the long run steady state. Then the short run dynamic structure is estimated, using the
long run relationships as error correction terms. When the system is out of equilibrium, i.e.
when the long run relationships between endogenous variables do not hold, the cointegrating
terms will make sure that the relevant variables move back towards their long run values.
The model can be written on the form:
yt= +
jX
i=1
 iyt i +
kX
i=1
iyt i + ut; (2.18)
where yt is a vector of (logged) endogenous variables,  is a vector of constants,  i and
i are parameter matrices 8i, and ut is a vector of error terms. Here the second term
on the right hand side constitute the error correction parts of the equations, which in each
equation describes a cointegrating relationship between the left hand side variable and a linear
combination of other variables. The short run dynamics is described by lags of di¤erenced
variables.
The model consists of equations for the wage, prices, productivity, output, unemployment,
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household credit, money market interest rates, and the nominal exchange rate. Wages are
modelled in a Nash bargaining framework meant to capture the high degree of coordination in
Norwegian wage setting. In the long run nominal wages will move one-for-one with the general
price level and productivity, and it will also depend to some extent on the unemployment
rate. Domestic prices are set by rms engaged in monopolistic competition. Thus the general
price level will in the long run depend on wages relative to productivity, as well as imported
prices. Long run equilibrium unemployment is determined by the growth of the real wage as
well as the real interest rate and output. The long run behaviour of the nominal exchange
rate is derived assuming that expected depreciation depends on deviations of the exchange
rate from its long run value, and that there is a constant long run risk premium in the foreign
exchange market. Movements in relative real interest rates do not lead to one-for-one changes
in the real exchange rate, as in the standard UIP condition.
Total production is in the long run determined to a large extent by government demand,
which in the original system is exogenous and will be assumed constant in our model (see
below). In addition, depreciations of the real exchange rate and decreases in the real interest
rate both a¤ect output positively in the long run. In the short run, output growth is sig-
nicantly a¤ected by its own lag, changes to government expenditures and changes in real
credit. The latter e¤ect might be due to frictions in the credit market. The growth of real
credit is in turn determined in the long run by the growth of output and - to a smaller extent
- by interest rate di¤erentials. Since output a¤ects credit and vice versa, there is a simple
nancial accelerator mechanism at work. Labour productivity depends in the long run both
on real wages, the unemployment rate and a linear trend. In the short run it is a¤ected by
the change in real wages.
Most of NAM is estimated equation-by-equation using OLS, but the wage and price
block is estimated as a system with full information maximum likelihood. Identication of
the system is achieved by means of theoretical and ad hoc overidentifying restrictions on
the short run dynamics. Seasonal dummies are added for better t. The original models
long run growth is driven by neutral technological progress, approximated by a linear trend
in labour productivity. Simulations show that the model induces in steady state a constant
growth rate (disregarding exogenous seasonal variations) of output, nominal wages and prices,
and constant values of the unemployment rate and the nominal exchange rate (Bårdsen and
Nymoen 2009: 879-883).
In order to make numerical simulations of the model tractable by making also nominal
variables stationary, we remove all trends and constant terms so that all variables are zero
in steady state. The original model can be viewed as a log-linearization. Under this inter-
pretation, the variables in our modied model will be interpreted as deviations of the actual
17
(logged) variables from either a deterministic balanced growth path (for some variables, such
as the output gap and productivity) or constant steady state values (for other variables,
including the ination rate and the unemployment rate). This corresponds roughly to the
log-linearization used to make NEMO and Leitemo stationary, and we will interpret the
relevant variables in the same way across models.
NAM contains several exogenous variables, namely government sector consumption; a
price index for electricity, fuel and lubricants; the oil price; and the payroll tax rate. This
poses a problem for our simulations. Instead of assuming dynamic processes for all these
variables, we set the domestic exogenous variables equal to zero (their steady state values) in
all periods. This is clearly unrealistic, and it means that the total variation in the endogenous
variables will be smaller than what is observed in the data. However, we do not want to
change the original model dynamics in any important ways by adding new equations, and
thus this approach is the most convenient for our purposes. As for the foreign variables,
we tried to model these in the same way as in NEMO, but the AR(1) process for foreign
ination created stability-problems in NAM, leading to innite variance of several important
variables, including the domestic ination rate. For this reason, we let foreign ination be
constant, but model the foreign interest rate as in the other models. In addition, the foreign
producer price index is held constant during simulations.
Because Dynare has trouble solving models in which some variables have innite variance
 which is the case for the nominal prices in NAM  we use a stationarized version when
calculating optimal policy rules. In this version, growth rates of price variables and the
cointegrating relationships are dened as new variables, but this transformation does not
a¤ect the structure of the model in any way that is relevant to us.
2.6 Transmission of monetary policy
We can roughly divide the "standard" transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in two:
an aggregate demand channel and an expectations channel (Svensson 1999; Svensson 2000).
The policy rate a¤ects demand directly through its e¤ect on the short term real interest rates
and thus on the relative value of saving versus consuming. For the simple new Keynesian
model in section 2.1.1, this is apparent in the IS equation 2.4. Demand then a¤ects ination
via equation 2.3, as a change in output induces a change in marginal costs. The expectations
channel is due to the forward-looking behaviour of agents, since expectations of future prices
and output a¤ects todays ination and output; consumers seek to smooth consumption over
time, while producers take into account future marginal costs. In an open economy, there
will also be a real exchange rate channel. A higher interest rate, ceteris paribus, immediately
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induces a real appreciation, which in turn leads to a decreased demand for domestic goods.
This contributes to the aggregate demand channel. A change in the real exchange rate will
also directly a¤ect ination as it changes the domestic currency price of imported goods.
In order to compare the responses to monetary policy in the four models, I let monetary
policy be given by a simple Taylor rule (see section 3.3) with an exogenous component ut
which follows a moderately persistent AR(1) process:
it = 1:5t + 0:5yt + ut (2.19)
ut = 0:5ut 1 + t;
where t is the year-on-year ination rate and t is a shock.
Figure 2.2 plots the ten year (40 quarters) responses of the year-on-year ination rate,
t, and the output gap, yt, to a one percentage point one period shock to t. The system
starts from steady state. Such a shock is not necessarily realistic, but it allows us to study
how monetary policy feeds through the economy.
In NEMO, due to rigidities in nominal prices, the shock causes a rise in the real interest
rate. Through the demand channel, this lowers consumption and investment demand, which
means that nal good rms will produce less and hence use less intermediates as inputs.
Consumption falls more for the spenders than for the savers, and nominal wages drop. Ex-
pected future marginal costs fall, and so there is an additional e¤ect on ination through the
expectations channel. The short run response is muted because rms adjust their utilization
rate of capital services. The exchange rate channel is at work through appreciation of the
currency and downward pressure on import prices measured in domestic currency. Even
though export prices increase in the short run due to a stronger domestic currency, they
fall subsequently with marginal costs, which means that export demand will eventually rise.
When ination and output falls, the interest rate is lowered, leading to a gradual movement
back to the steady state.
The e¤ects are similar in Credit NEMO, but the presence of the housing sector gives an
additional channel through which the monetary policy a¤ects the economy. A higher real
interest rate leads to lower house prices and thus a lower value of the housing stock. This
means that impatient households can borrow less, since they have less collateral, and as a
result there is an additional e¤ect on the output gap.
In LGM, the e¤ects of a shock to the policy rate conform closely to those in the simple
model in section 2.1.1, but there is a more complicated lag structure. The combination of
backward and forward terms in the ination and output equations induce a clear hump-
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shaped response in these variables, partly through the expectations channel. The exchange
rate channel is at work through the law of one price gap, which decreases immediately when
the real exchange rate appreciates. Importing rms then seek to close the gap by lowering
domestic prices on imported goods. Compared to NEMO and Credit NEMO, the reactions
of ination and output in LGM are characterized by larger and more persistent uctuations.
This is partly because the Taylor rule is not very e¤ective at stabilizing these variables in
LGM (see section 4.3.1).
In NAM, there is both a real exchange rate channel and a demand channel of mone-
tary policy, but not an expectations channel. The policy rate a¤ects the economy indirectly
through its e¤ect on the bank rate. The demand channel goes through both the unemploy-
ment rate and the output gap. The immediate rise in the nominal rate increases the nominal
and real exchange rate, which (with a lag) leads to a lower production level. The real ex-
change rate appreciates immediately, which in turn lowers the growth rate of import prices
and hence also CPI ination. The drop in ination means that the real interest rate will rise
even more than the nominal rate, and thus output falls more. There is an indirect exchange
rate e¤ect, as a stronger currency means decreased competitiveness and thus lower output
and higher unemployment. In this model there is also a labour market channel of monetary
policy, but it has a negligible e¤ect on these variables. Because of the complex autoregressive
processes, there are considerable short run uctuations in both ination and the output gap.
The lack of an expectations channel in NAM separates it from the other models. When
agents are optimizing and forward-looking, they will take into account how monetary policy
is expected to be conducted in the future. Thus the short run responses in the endogenous
variables will depend on how the policy rule is specied in NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM,
but not in NAM.
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Figure 2.2: The responses of year-on-year ination (upper panel) and the output gap (lower panel) to a
moderately persistent one percentage point initial shock to the policy rate. Monetary policy follows the
Taylor rule. The numbers on the horizontal axis are quarters after initial impact.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical background: optimal
policy, simple rules, and robustness
3.1 Social welfare and the loss function
Most central banks today operate a monetary policy regime that is called ination target-
ing. According to Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), "the hallmark of ination targeting is the
announcement by the government, the central bank, or some combination of the two that in
the future the central bank will strive to hold ination at or near some numerically specied
level." In Norway, this level is 2:5% for the annual consumer price ination (Finansdeparte-
mentet 2001). Most central banks also make room for other, secondary objectives, such as
stabilization of the output gap or the exchange rate. There is today a general agreement
both in policy circles and in the literature that stabilization of ination around some target
and output around some trend should be the main  and possibly the only  goals of mon-
etary policy (Woodford 2003: 382). Such a regime is generally referred to as exible ination
targeting, and it is in this context I analyze monetary policy in this thesis.
Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) point to several theoretical developments that played a
rule in ushering in the ination targeting regimes, namely "reduced condence in activist,
countercyclical monetary policy; the widespread acceptance of the view that there is no
long run trade-o¤ between output (or unemployment) and ination, so that monetary policy
a¤ects only prices in the long run; theoretical arguments for the value of precommitment and
credibility in monetary policy [...]; and an increasing acceptance of the proposition that low
ination promotes long run economic growth and e¢ ciency." As I have discussed in section
2.1, the lack of a long run trade-o¤ is grounded in the new Keynesian modelling tradition.
The issue of precommitment is discussed in section 3.2.1. In the present section I show why
(exible) ination targeting is generally accepted as best practice monetary policy, and how
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it can be expressed by means of a welfare loss function.
A welfare loss function can either be derived from fundamentals using a complete micro-
founded model of the economy, or it can be chosen in a more ad hoc manner. In any case,
the standard expected loss function is quadratic and can be written on the following general
form:
L = E0
1X
t=0
tY Tt Yt; (3.1)
where Yt is a column vector of variables (called the target variables) at time t,  is a quadratic
form and  is a discount factor. For the most part,  is a diagonal matrix, so that each
periods contribution to the loss function consists of a weighted sum of squared variables.
It turns out that only a small set of variables need to be included in the vector Yt
in equation 3.1 when the loss is derived from fundamentals. Starting from simple New-
Keynesian models similar to the one presented in section 2.1.1, Gali (2008: 86-89) and
Woodford (2003: ch. 6) derive a function for the expected welfare loss expressed as a fraction
of steady state consumption level:
L =  E0
1X
t=0
t

Ut   U
UcC

= E0
1X
t=0
tLpt ; (3.2)
where Ut is period t utility, U is steady state utility, and C is steady state consumption. L
p
t
is the period loss, which is given by
Lpt = 
2
t + yy
2
t ; (3.3)
where  and y are constants that depend on the parameters of the model.
In these simple models with optimizing agents and sticky prices, expected welfare de-
creases with the square of the deviation of ination from the optimal ination rate, which
I have assumed is zero, and the square of the gap between output and the natural level of
output. This is derived assuming that utility depends only on consumption and labour sup-
ply. Furthermore, it is assumed that the steady state exible price equilibrium is an e¢ cient
one1.
1Galí (2008) assumes that steady state distortions due to e.g. monopolistic price setting can be o¤set
using scal policy.
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A uctuating output gap means that the average markup over marginal costs in the
economy will uctuate. When prices are rigid, this implies that the use of labour in production
will be ine¢ cient. Thus it is optimal to stabilize the output gap in order to stabilize the
average markup. Even though price changes are not directly associated with welfare, they
will have an indirect e¤ect: since not all prices change at the same time, a non-zero ination
rate implies relative price distortions that result in deadweight losses due to an ine¢ cient
composition of production (Woodford 2003: 383). For example, when ination is positive,
rms that have not re-optimized in a long time sell at lower prices than their competitors and
will thus produce more than they should for an e¢ cient allocation. Perfect price stability
will then eliminate all incentives for rms to change prices even when they are allowed to,
and so this situation is similar to the one with perfect price exibility.
Incorporating the interest rate into the loss function can also be motivated from micro-
behaviour. Woodford (2003: 420-424) shows how the square of the deviation of the interest
rate from its steady state value enters the period loss once transaction frictions are considered
and real money balances are included in the utility function. Williams (2003) adopts a similar
constraint on interest rate variability for more ad hoc reasons, one of which is that a highly
volatile short term rate might lead to higher long term rates through a higher term premium.
Another practical reason for placing some weight on this term is that when it is left out,
the optimal policy might be so aggressive that the nominal interest rate will often hit the
zero lower bound (Levin, Wieland, and Williams 1999). Since variation in the change in
the interest rate from period to period seem in practice to matter more for policymakers
than does variations in the rate itself, Ilbas et al. (2012), Levin and Williams (2003) and
Orphanides and Williams (2008) substitute it = (it   it 1) for it.
Issues that are specic to open economies might present other problems. In particular,
these might be related to uctuations in the real exchange rate and the relative prices between
the domestic economy and the foreign economy. Clarida et al. (2001) nds that the open
economy loss function is the same as for the closed economy counterpart when there is
complete pass-through of real exchange rate uctuations to the domestic economy2. Corsetti
et al. (2010) allow for incomplete pass-through along the lines of the LGM model (see
section 2.4). They nd that also the law-of-one-price gap, reecting the di¤erence between
the domestic price and the world price of the same good, must be added to the loss function
in this case.
The loss function I employ for welfare analysis in this thesis is not directly derived from
any single model, although it is based on the theoretical considerations above. It has the
2The only di¤erence is that the domestic ination rate should enter the loss function instead of the
aggregate rate. I disregard this point in order to stay closer to the actual loss function used by Norges Bank.
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following functional form:
L = E0
1X
t=0
t

2t + yy
2
t + i(it   it 1)2
	
; (3.4)
where t is the year-on-year ination rate3. Written on this form, the weight on uctuations
in the ination rate is for simplicity normalized to one, since we are in any case not interested
in the absolute value of the loss.
There are several reasons why an ad hoc loss function is preferred to one derived from
fundamentals. First, the models employed might be either insu¢ ciently micro founded or
too complex for a true welfare function to be derived (Ilbas, Røisland, and Sveen 2012).
The former holds for NAM and LGM, while the latter applies to NEMO and Credit NEMO.
Second, commonly used models do not capture all of the costs due to uctuations in the
economy (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999), and thus it is necessary to use some extra-model
judgement when deciding on the objectives. Third, at least parts of the objectives are usually
given to the central bank by law and are therefore outside of its control.
Equation 3.4 corresponds to the specication used by Norges Bank as an operational-
ization of the exible ination targeting mandate and the preferences of the policymaker
(Holmsen et al. 2008). The Bank has outlined a set of criteria by which its interest rate
setting can be assessed (Qvigstad 2006; Norges Bank 2012). First, ination should be sta-
bilized around target in the medium term. Second, there should be some balance between
stabilization of ination around target and output around the trend. Third, the interest
rate should be changed gradually and in a way that is consistent with the previous response
pattern4. These three criteria can be represented by the three terms in equation 3.4. This
specication of the loss does not take into account the specic open economy issues discussed
above, since these are not explicitly part of the stated criteria or the loss function used by
Norges Bank. I assume that volatility of the exchange rate is only important to the extent
that it a¤ects the volatility of ination or the output gap.
There is little consensus in the literature on the size of the weights in the loss function
(Levin and Williams 2003; Cateau 2007). This is true even when the loss function is derived
from fundamentals. For example, y is very sensitive to what kind of stickiness in prices
that is assumed; while Calvo pricing decisions typically lead to a very low weight on output
3The choice between the year-on-year rate and the quarterly annualized rate is not clear-cut. However,
the year-on-year rate seems to correspond more closely to Norges Banks mandate. The (approximate)
relationship between the quarterly annualized rate t and the year-on-year rate t is: t = 14 (t + t 1 +
t 2 + t 3).
4In addition, a robustness criterion is given. I leave this for later discussion.
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stabilization (y  0:01), Taylor-type xed duration contracts typically give a much higher
weight (y  1). Similarly, while Svensson (2003) argues that it is di¢ cult to motivate
theoretically a weight on interest rate stabilization, estimation show that this is needed to
match actual policy (Cateau 2007). In actual policymaking, however, the weights are rarely
chosen based on a theoretical derivation from a single model.
For simulation purposes, it is convenient to express the loss function in a di¤erent form
than equation 3.4. As shown by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), for 0 <   1 we can
express the intertemporal loss function as the unconditional mean of the period loss function.
Since the unconditional mean of each of the target variables is zero, the loss function is then
written
L = V ar [t] + yV ar [yt] + iV ar [it   it 1] ; (3.5)
where I have multiplied the loss by (1   ) as a normalization, since only relative changes
in the size of the loss is important in my analysis. Thus the relevant loss criterium is the
weighted average of the unconditional variances.
3.2 Optimal policy
I denote by optimal policy the policy that uses all available information  contained in
exogenous and endogenous variables  in order to minimize a specied loss function. This
involves solving an optimization problem in which the objective is the loss function and
the structural equations of ones model appear as constraints. There are several ways to
describe such an optimal policy; the instrument can be specied as a function of exogenous
disturbances, or in terms of projected or past values of endogenous variables.
3.2.1 Rules versus discretion
A classic distinction in the monetary policy literature is that between the optimal discre-
tionary solution and the optimal policy when commitment to follow a rule is possible. In the
former case, the policymaker sets the interest rate every period by solving a new optimization
problem under no constraints resulting from previous commitment. Knowing that he will
re-optimize next period  and knowing that the private sector knows this  he takes private
sector expectations of future variables as given. This is because these expectations are not
a¤ected by the current interest rate. As shown rst by Kydland and Prescott (1977), when
the policymaker is unable to commit, the promise of a certain path for the instrument is time
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inconsistent; it is optimal to renege on the plan and re-optimize next period, and the private
sector knows this.
When solving a commitment problem, however, the central bank chooses conditions that
will hold in any future period, and thus its choice of policy will a¤ect expectations of the
future. It is the binding commitment to a future reaction function that makes the policy
credible and thus steers expectations. When expectations of the future a¤ects todays equilib-
rium, the possibility of manipulating these expectations using policy means that the central
bank can bring about a better outcome than under discretion. The discretionary policymaker
fails to internalize the consequences of peoples anticipation of his own future conduct. More
specically, there are two separate problems with discretionary optimization. First, there
is a possible positive bias in the average ination rate when the policymaker tries to push
output above its potential level by exploiting the short run trade-o¤ between ination and
output (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). Second, the discretionary pol-
icymakers reaction to shocks will in general be ine¢ cient and for this reason lead to larger
welfare losses than when commitment is possible (Woodford 2003; Clarida et al. 1999).
In most cases, then, the equilibrium and the reactions to disturbances that can be achieved
by a committed policymaker dominate those achievable by one who reoptimize every period
5. For this reason, commitment to some type of rule is my starting point when considering
optimal policy in this thesis. Clearly, full commitment is not achievable in practice; every
central bank will at least be open to changing the weights in the loss function and details
in the reference model, and the public knows this. However, clear commitment to a target
ination rate in the medium term and regular publication of forecasts of ination, output
and the interest rate path, as monetary policy is practiced in Norway, entails commitment to
a large extent. Holmsen et al. (2008) document that Norges Banks communication of policy
intentions is fairly e¤ective at stabilizing private sector expectations. In addition, it seems
reasonable to assume that Norges Bank does not try to push output above its potential level.
In any case, I assume in the following that the central bank has access to some "commitment
technology" that makes commitment to a rule in an innite perspective possible.
3.2.2 Optimal commitment policy: targeting rules and direct in-
strument rules
As an illustration of how optimal commitment policy is calculated, consider the case when
the quadratic loss function only includes ination and the output gap, and the economy is
5Dennis (2010) nds that when the commitment policy is calculated in a timeless perspective, in Wood-
fordss (2003) sense, the discretionary solution is in some cases preferred.
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described by the simple new Keynesian model from section 2.1.1. Then the Lagrangian of
the optimization problem is written
E0
1X
t=0
t

2t + yy
2
t + t [t   yt   t+1]
	
: (3.6)
The IS equation is omitted because it has no impact on the problem in this case. The
rst-order conditions are given by
E0

2t + t   t 1
	
= 0 (3.7)
E0 f2yyt   tg = 0:
These conditions must hold for every state of the world at each date t  0. In addition,
we need an initial condition on the Lagrange multiplier,  1 = 0
6.
There are several ways to proceed from here in order to implement the optimal policy.
Svensson (2003) argues in favour of what he calls targeting rules, of which he makes a dis-
tinction between the general and the specic sort. The former species only the general
objectives of policy, which involves identication of the target variables (e.g. ination and
the output gap), the target values for these variables, and the loss function to be minimized.
This procedure allows for the use of judgement in the decision process, since it is not speci-
ed how the forecasts of the target variables in equation 3.7 should be calculated. A specic
targeting rule, on the other hand, amounts to a list of the rst-order conditions from the
optimization problem, and thus to the use of a specic model. Since we have no interest in
the Lagrange multiplier in itself, we can simplify the conditions above into a single one that
relates ination to the output gap in every period t  1,
E0

t +
y

(yt   yt 1)

= 0. (3.8)
This relation between the ination rate and the growth rate of the output gap must
be projected at time zero to hold for every future period. As shown by Woodford (2003:
523), a commitment to this relationship ensures  under quite general conditions  a
unique equilibrium that corresponds to the one solving the rst-order conditions above. This
6Woodford (2003) argues that the multiplier(s) should be set in such a way that there is nothing to gain
in period zero from re-optimizing. In this way the policy will be optimal in a "timeless perspective", and it
will be time consistent. For simplicity I do not consider this approach here.
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specic targeting rule makes no reference to either the policy instrument or the exogenous
disturbances.
McCallum and Nelson (2005) argues that Svenssons suggestion of specifying monetary
policy only through a relationship between certain target variables falls short of what can be
considered a monetary policy rule, since there is no reference to the interest rate. Another
way to specify optimal policy involves solving the system of rst-order conditions and con-
straint(s) in order to get unique bounded solutions of t and yt in every period in terms of
the expected shocks at di¤erent horizons (Woodford 2003: 488-490). These are the optimal
state-contingent paths of the target variables. In general, any variable at any time will de-
pend on the whole history of shocks as well as expected shocks at all future dates. We can
then substitute for t and yt in the IS equation to solve for the state-contingent path of the
policy rate that will implement the optimal equilibrium.
A problem with this solution, however, is that it is not implementable, since the values
of the shocks are not directly observable. Thus it is more interesting to look for rules that
involve only endogenous variables, and, more precisely, only the observed and projected paths
of the target variables. Such rules are what Woodford (2003: 547) call direct instrument rules.
Following Svensson (1999), I dene an instrument rule to be a rule that expresses the interest
rate as a function of one or more variables. The rule is explicit if the instrument is a function
of only predetermined variables (this might include lags), and it is implicit if it is a function
also of non-predetermined variables. The implicitness comes from the fact that when non-
predetermined variables such as expected ination is present, the actual interest rate is only
determined in equilibrium. For example, whereas last periods ination rate t 1 is readily
observable when the interest rate it is set, the value of the expected rate next period, Ett+1,
depends on which policy is in place, since this policy a¤ects todays expectations. Thus if
the interest rate reacts to the expected ination rate, the e¤ective policy rate is determined
together with the other variables as an equilibrium condition. For an implicit rule to be well-
dened, it must  given the other equations of the model  be consistent with a determinate
solution for the implied path of the instrument (Woodford 2003: 544-545).
When the structural model can be written on the form of equation 2.5 and the loss function
as equation 3.4, Woodford (2003: 550-556) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003) show that
it is possible to implement the optimal state-contingent equilibrium with an implicit direct
instrument rule. As time t forecasts of future variables can be expressed in terms of variables
observed at time t, it is also possible to write this optimal rule as an explicit one, but in
that case the policy rate will depend also on other variables than those included in the loss
function.
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3.3 Simple rules
Roughly speaking, a simple interest rate rule is a guide for interest rate setting that is based
only on a small amount of the information that is available to the policymaker; that is, it is
an instrument rule with only a small number of arguments7. One of the simplest and most
commonly known rules is the one proposed by Taylor (1993) and subsequently referred to as
the Taylor rule:
it = i+ 1:5(t   ) + 0:5yt; (3.9)
where i is the long term (average) interest rate and  is the annual target ination rate (2:5%
in Norway)8. Although the exact coe¢ cients in front of ination and the output gap are not
optimized in any way, this rule was chosen by Taylor because it has some of the general
properties of rules found to perform well. It has two important characteristics (Taylor and
Williams 2010). First, the real interest rate rises in response to an increase in ination.
This is generally a requirement for stability in most DSGE models, since a failure to adjust
the rate in this way can lead to self-fullling expectations of higher ination (Galí 2008).
Second, it "leans against the wind", meaning that it speeds up the progress back to the long
run equilibrium when the economy is hit by a shock. The Taylor rule can mimic the actual
path of the policy rate in the USA (Taylor 1993), and it performs quite well in several models
not available when the rule was rst proposed (Taylor 1999). For these reasons, the Taylor
rule is a natural starting point when discussing robustness.
Even though a simple contemporaneous rule like the Taylor rule might t the data rea-
sonably well, a more dynamic specication is often preferred. One way to get some partial
adjustment of the interest rate is to include the lag of the rate itself in the rule, so that,
ceteris paribus, the change from period to period will be smaller9. As noted by Clarida et al.
(2000), there is in fact evidence of a tendency for central banks to smooth interest rates.
Woodford (2003) shows that some degree of interest rate smoothing is necessary to imple-
ment the optimum in models with forward-looking agents. The reason is that inertia implies
a degree of commitment to future rates, and this might reassure the agents. Another way to
implement some history dependence in monetary policy decisions is to include lagged target
7Galí (2008) uses two more specic criteria, namely that a simple rule should only depend on observable
variables and not require any precise knowledge of the exact model.
8Since in most models both t and yt are non-predetermined at t, this rule is actually implicit ; there is for
example feedback from the interest rate to ination intra-period. I will nevertheless treat instrument rules
that contain information at time t as explicit rules (see also section 4.1).
9I refer to this aspect as either interest rate smoothing, inertia or history dependence.
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variables, e.g. by substituting t by t 1. If information about the current ination rate
is not available when the central bank makes its decision, this might be a more reasonable
description of policy (McCallum 1999). In addition, using both contemporary and lagged
information might improve the performance of the rule (see section 4.1).
Yet another modication of the Taylor rule is to allow for reaction to expected future
variables. Clarida et al. (2000) propose rules of the form
it = i+ it 1 + (Et [t;t+k]  ) + yEt [yt;t+q] ; (3.10)
where ,  and y are reaction coe¢ cients, t;t+k is the annualized ination rate between
period t and t+ k, and yt;t+q is the average output gap between periods t and t+ q. This is
obviously an implicit instrument rule, since the expectations of future variables is conditioned
on the information available at t that is relevant for these variables, including the current
interest rate.
Other variables might also be included in the instrument rule. In a small, open economy
such as that of Norway, a natural suggestion is the exchange rate (either nominal or real).
There is, however, quite a lot of disagreement about whether this is a good idea  at least
when the exchange rate is not included in the loss function. While Ball (1999) nds that
including the real exchange rate improves the performance of a simple rule dramatically, both
Taylor (2001) and Batini et al. (2003) nd only a marginal e¤ect.
An optimized simple instrument rule is a rule within a certain class in which the parame-
ters have been chosen to minimize a loss function. For example, let the class of Taylor-type
rules be given by
it = t + yyt; (3.11)
where  and y are general parameters, and the steady-state and target values of all variables
are assumed to be zero (as they are in the models I use). The optimal rule within this class
is found by choosing the parameter values that minimize the loss function given the model
equations. For complicated models like the ones I consider in this thesis, a numerical search
algorithm is employed to optimize over the parameters in the rule in order to nd the best
combination. Depending on the model, the optimized simple rule may yield losses close to
or far away from what is the case under the fully optimal policy.
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3.3.1 Optimal policy versus simple rules
There is an extensive discussion in the literature on the relative virtues of simple rules and
optimal policy. An obvious advantage of the former lie in their simplicity: they are easy
to communicate to the private sector, and it is easy for outside observers to verify that the
central bank does its job if it has committed itself to follow such a rule. At any point in
time, anyone familiar with simple arithmetic can check whether the policy rate is at the level
implied by the simple rule. However, as pointed out by Svensson (2003), no central bank
has ever committed itself to following a simple rule. And according to Svensson there is a
good reason for this: any simple instrument rule will only take into account a limited amount
of information, and in many cases this will be quite restrictive on the degree to which the
central bank is able to stabilize the economy. In cases when the scope of action is limited by
the rule, it is unlikely that the policymaker will stick mechanically to it.
For this reason, Svensson argues that the only realistic and sensible use of simple rules
is as "guidelines" or "benchmarks" in a more complex policy making process. Taylor (1993)
advocated such an approach when he introduced his rule: "There will be episodes where mon-
etary policy will need to be adjusted to deal with special factors." But according to Svensson
(2003) "there are no rules for when deviations from the instrument rule are appropriate".
Thus there is a problem of implementation, as the idea of a guideline is "too vague to be
operational". Svensson advocates instead the use of optimal policy implemented through
targeting rules, which allows for using all available information  both from within and
outside of a model  in order to forecast the target variables.
McCallum and Nelson (2005), on the other hand, point out that the Taylor-type rules
that are Svenssons main culprits do not comprise the entire class of simple instrument rules,
and that when other types of information than contemporary ination and output is allowed
to enter the rule, it can in fact perform quite well. Taylor and Williams (2010) argue that
the informational advantage that optimal policy has over simple rules is in fact quite small in
most models. When we allow for simple rules that are optimized, this is especially evident.
Even in a large scale models such as the Federal Reserve Boards FRB/US model, Williams
(2003) nds that an optimized three parameter rule that includes the lagged interest rate does
not perform much worse than the fully optimal policy. The reason is that other variables
are highly correlated with the ones included in the rule, and consequently the additional
information they provide is small. The conclusion seems to be that although simple rules
with xed parameters, such as the Taylor rule, might be far from optimal in a given model,
an optimized simple rule will still be able to approximate the fully optimal policy fairly well.
Furthermore, the policy that is fully optimal in one model might perform worse than a
simple rule in another. That is, simple rules might be more robust to model uncertainty than
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more complex policies (Levin et al. 2005). This is the subject of the next section.
3.4 Robust monetary policy
The basic idea behind robustness of monetary policy is that the interest rate should be set in
a way that leads to acceptable results for several possible specications of how the economy
functions. That is, even if the policymaker believes in a model that is wrong along some
dimension, the policy he employs should not lead to disaster. The reason why this is desired
is summed up succinctly by Bennett McCallum:
Because there is a great deal of professional disagreement as to the proper speci-
cation of a structural macroeconomic model, it seems likely to be more fruitful
to strive to design a policy rule that works reasonably well in a variety of plausi-
ble quantitative models, rather than to derive a rule that is optimal in any one
particular model. (Cited in Hansen and Sargent 2003)
Several studies have found that optimal policy in a single model  either the fully optimal
type or an optimized simple rule in cases where such a rule provides a good approximation
 might have bad stabilization properties when there is uncertainty about the true model
of the economy (see e.g. Levin et al. 1999 and Levin and Williams 2003). Which model
specications are considered "plausible", what kind of uncertainty is considered, and which
types of policies are advocated as robust ones vary considerably in the literature, however.
Levin et al. (2005) distinguish between three aspects, or levels, of model uncertainty.
First, there might be innovation uncertainty in that the type and nature of shocks hitting
the economy is unknown. Second, there is generally also uncertainty about the sizes of
parameter values in the preferred model. Third, there is specication uncertainty when it
comes to central structural features of the model, such as the nature of price-setting. We
can also make a distinction between two ways of treating the policymakers preferences. One
way is to specify, within a Bayesian decision making framework, probabilities on each of the
elements in the set of possible outcomes or models. The second way is to refuse to specify
any probabilities and instead only focus on the worst possible outcome. In the following I
present a brief and limited surveys of how these kinds of uncertainty and preferences are
treated in the literature.
3.4.1 Robust control
The robust control framework developed by Hansen and Sargent (2008) has been very inu-
ential for the way robustness to model uncertainty is treated, also in the monetary policy
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literature. This approach takes as given some linear reference model and considers uncer-
tainty around this model. More specically, the reference model is surrounded by a continuum
of unspecied models that depart from it in that they contain additive specication errors
(Hansen and Sargent 2010). Thus this is a kind of innovation uncertainty. The policymaker
is assumed to be uncertainty averse, which means that he prefers to know the probabilities of
di¤erent models rather than having to form subjective probabilities over them10. Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) propose an explanation and axiomatization of such behaviour: the poli-
cymaker has too little information to form a subjective (prior) distribution over the possible
models, and instead he considers a several possible probabilities on each model. When mak-
ing a decision, he takes into account the largest expected loss over all models in the set; that
is, he only cares about the worst case outcome. Hansen and Sargent model this as a game
with two participants: an "evil agent"  representing the uncertainty  chooses additive
terms to the reference model in order to maximize the expected loss, while the policymaker
chooses a policy to minimize this loss. The evil agent is given a "budget" that constrains how
far away from the reference model the worst case model can lie and which corresponds to the
set of subjective prior beliefs over the models. Thus, the idea is to minimize the worst case
outcome within a set of outcomes that are practically indistinguishable from the reference
model.
Leitemo and Söderström (2008) use the Hansen-Sargent framework to calculate a state-
contingent optimal policy in a small open economy model. They nd that an increase in the
"preference for robustness" makes policy respond more cautiously to some shocks and more
aggressively to other. Onatski and Stock (2002) analyze uncertainty concerning the additive
shocks in a simple backward-looking model. Giannoni (2002) builds on the same framework
in order to consider uncertainty about the parameter values in a simple new Keynesian model
when the instrument rule is constrained to be of the form of equation 3.11. He nds that
the robust policy should react stronger to ination than the optimal policy of this type in
the reference model. Brock and Durlauf (2005) construct a general framework to analyze
robustness to parameter uncertainty when the possible parameter values can lie in a ball
around the reference values. These papers all consider only the worst case outcome when
nding optimal policy.
There are two problems with this approach. First, it is not obvious that guarding only
against the worst possible outcome is the best way to model the preferences of the policy-
maker. He might not have much belief at all in the worst case model. Moreover, it is not even
clear that actual policymakers are unable and/or unwilling to specify single prior beliefs on
the various models, and even when they are, the minmax criterium is not the only possible
10This kind of aversion is related to the so-called Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg 1961).
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operationalization of his preferences. An alternative is to specify beliefs over di¤erent models,
and then minimize the weighted loss. Levin et al. (2005) calculate the expected loss in a
small scale new Keynesian model when there is uncertainty about parameter values, using
the posterior distributions of the parameters from a Bayesian estimation of the model. In
this way, more weight is given to model variants that have a higher posterior density, and so
the resulting policy is one that performs reasonably well in the models that are more likely
to be relevant.
Second, it might be misleading to consider only alternative models that di¤er from the
reference in terms of additive disturbances or the size of parameters, while keeping the struc-
tural properties of the model xed. There is considerable uncertainty and discussion in the
literature about such fundamental aspects as the nature of wage- and price-setting and ex-
pectations formation, and this specication uncertainty might be more important for policy
making than relatively small di¤erences in parameter values. Levin and Williams (2003)
reveal some of the pitfalls of the robust control approach. They nd that properties of the
robust rules found by Onatski and Stock (2002) and Giannoni (2002) make them perform
badly in alternative models. Levin et al. (2005) show that a rule that is nearly optimal for
the reference model they employ is robust to changes to parameter values and some shock
processes, but not to changes to more fundamental aspects of the model, such as the nature
of price-setting. Furthermore, the fully optimal policy from one model can also generate huge
losses in others, and even lead to instability. Thus, to the extent that we have any doubt
at all about the structural properties of our reference model, the robust control framework
seems insu¢ cient for robustness analyses.
3.4.2 Robust simple rules in non-nested models
An alternative approach (Levin et al. 1999; Levin and Williams 2003; Brock et al. 2007;
Taylor and Williams 2010) is to consider several models with in some cases very di¤erent
structural properties. This corresponds to the third kind of model uncertainty outlined above.
The models are called "non-nested", since the alternative models are not special cases of a
general reference model. They can range from simple, completely forward-looking models,
via more complicated new Keynesian models, to completely backward-looking models such
as the one constructed by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
The endeavour to evaluate simple instrument rules using several non-nested models dates
back at least to McCallum (1988), who simulate a monetary base growth rule in both non-
structural vector autoregressions (VARs), an RBC model and structural models with nominal
frictions. A somewhat di¤erent approach is to nd rules that in some sense are optimized for
the set of models at hand. Levin and Williams (2003) calculate both rules that minimize an
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average of the losses from all the models and rules that minimize the maximum loss. If the
subjective probability that model m in the countable set M is the correct one is pm, and the
policy r is chosen from the set R of possible (simple) rules, these optimization problems are,
respectively, given by
min
r2R
X
m2M
pmLm (3.12)
and
min
r2R
max
m2M
fLmg ; (3.13)
where Lm is the loss in model m. The rst I will call the Bayesian criterion, and the second
the minmax criterion.
The probabilities in equation (3.12) can either be chosen in an ad hoc way using extraneous
information (Levin and Williams 2003)11 or updated using Bayeslaw after evaluating the
likelihood function of the model given the observed data (Levin et al. 2005; Brock et al. 2003).
Cogley et al. (2011) calculate Bayesian rules in this way when there is uncertainty both about
type of model and about the parameter values in each model. Brock and Durlauf (2005) argue
that the minmax criterion is most appropriate when the model space is constituted only of
models that are fairly close to the reference model, as is the case in Hansen and Sargents
robust control framework. If the models have very di¤erent structural properties, models that
are highly improbable might dominate the selection of policy, since only the model with the
highest loss is considered. Still, the minmax criterion can be useful in conjunction with the
Bayesian criterion, and the two might even be combined in one single criterion (see section
4.3.1).
3.4.3 Robustifying optimal policy
As pointed out in section 3.3.1, a problem with this approach is that complete commitment
to a simple rule  even one that is robust to model misspecication  is unrealistic. How-
ever, the lack of robustness of fully optimal policy makes it problematic when there is some
uncertainty about the "true" model. Ilbas et al. (2012) propose an intermediate way between
11To call this approach "Bayesian" involves a slight misuse of terminology, since no actual Bayesian updat-
ing (using Bayestheorem) is involved. It might be more aptly named "model averaging" (Brock, Durlauf,
and West 2003). However, since the term Bayesian is used also when the probabilities are xed in most of
the robustness literature, I will do so in this thesis.
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these two extremes. They formulate a modied loss function of the form
Lmod = E0
1X
t=0
t

(1  ) 2t + yy2t + i(it   it 1)2+ (it   ist)2	 ; (3.14)
where ist is the interest rate given by some simple rule and  2 [0; 1] is the weight on the
deviation of the actual rate it from ist . This loss function operationalizes the policymakers
aversion to straying too far away from the simple rule. Given a reference model, the chosen
policy is the one that minimizes the modied loss function. Lmod should not be seen as the
true welfare loss, but rather as a means for "robustifying" optimal policy. Put another way,
we calculate optimal policy with cross-checking from a simple rule (Ilbas et al. 2012). In this
way, simple rules can potentially be used as guidelines in a way that is completely transparent
and avoids the problems pointed out by Svensson (2003).
The reasoning behind this kind of robustness check for a central bank might go something
like the following. I assume that the policymaker has access to a reference model of the
economy. This model is the one he sees as most likely to be a correct representation of the
relevant aspects of the economy of all the models that are available to him. However, he
still has some doubt about this model, and therefore he wants to consider also several other
models, some of which have very di¤erent properties from the reference. If it turns out that
the optimal policy in the reference model will lead to unwanted uctuations should one of
the other models be correct, the policymaker needs some way to make the policy robust. One
way to do this might be to calculate optimal policy in the reference model when deviations
from a simple, robust rule are given some weight in the objective function.
The idea of using such a modied loss function is similar to the idea of delegating policy
making to a conservative central banker when commitment is not possible (Rogo¤ 1985).
In that case, a discretionary policymaker who places a higher relative weight on ination
stabilization than what is given by the true social loss function will implement a better
policy in terms of the true loss. Similarly, a policymaker who uses the modied loss function
given by equation 3.14 when calculating the optimal commitment policy will implement a
policy that is more robust to model uncertainty in terms of the original loss. Thus, it might
be optimal to appoint a central banker who uses a simple rule as a guideline and correction
to optimal policy. Alternatively, we can think of a policy making committee where the
members have di¤erent beliefs about which model describes the economy best. The modied
loss function is then a way to summarize these di¤erent preferences and beliefs in a single
objective that everyone can agree on.
My approach to robust monetary policy di¤ers in several respects from that found in other
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papers. First, in contrast to the robust control literature, I use only a small set of models,
but these models have very di¤erent structural properties. The inclusion of NAM makes
them even more di¤erent than the ones used by Levin et al. (1999) and Levin and Williams
(2003). Second, I consider only uncertainty between di¤erent models, not uncertainty about
the internal mechanisms of each model, such as shocks and parameters. Third, while Ilbas
et al. (2012) use American models, my models are all estimated on Norwegian data12.
Furthermore, NEMO is in regular use in Norges Bank, and an extended version of NAM,
SMM, is also used for policy analysis. Using these models thus makes the analysis more
relevant for actual policy making in small, open economies in general, and for Norway in
particular.
12Akram and Nymoen (2009) investigate robustness properties of policy rules when the suite of models
consists of Norwegian models similar to NAM but with di¤erent supply side features.
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Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Optimal implementable policy in NEMO
For the optimal state-contingent policy from NEMO to be implementable in other models,
these models must contain the same state variables as NEMO. This is obviously not the case
for my models. But as noted in section 3.2.2, it is possible to implement the optimal policy
through an implicit direct instrument rule that only contains lags and leads of the target
variables. When the loss function is given by equation 3.4, the optimal rule can be expressed
as
it =
hiX
j= li
jEtit+j +
hX
j= l
;jEtt+j +
hyX
j= ly
y;jEtyt+j; (4.1)
where li; hi; l; :::; hy are constants that determine the required number of lags and leads.
A problem with this general rule when we consider several non-nested models is that
forecasts of endogenous variables are model-dependent. Levin et al. (2003) propose two
ways to deal with this. One is to construct the forecasts of target variables in a model-
consistent way, that is, by means of the model that implements the rule. In this case it
is not possible to compare the losses generated by a given rule across models; the rule will
not be the same when implemented in di¤erent models, as the forecasts  and hence the
variables the interest rate reacts to  will di¤er. This makes such an approach infeasible
when the purpose is to compare the outcome of the same policy rule in alternative models.
The other possibility is to use model-inconsistent forecasts. This means that the model used
for calculating the optimal rule is also used to generate forecasts to be used when the rule is
implemented in all the other models. This presupposes that the alternative models can be
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nested within the rule-generating model, in the sense that all state variables present in the
latter are also present in the former. This is not the case for my models, and hence also this
approach is infeasible.
I must therefore restrict the allowed information to that which can be observed without
the use of a forecasting model. This means that at time t only the variables observed at
times t; t   1; t   2; ::: can be used when setting the policy rate; that is, hi = h = hy = 0
in equation 4.1. This is the approach taken by Orphanides and Williams (2008). It might
potentially be quite restrictive if optimal policy in fact depends heavily on forecasts of future
states, but as shown below this does not turn out to be too big a problem in NEMO. I will
denote this kind of feedback rule that only depends on contemporary or past target variables
variables an implementable rule1.
There are two opposing concerns when choosing the number of lags of each variable in the
rule, the numbers li, l and ly. First, an optimal operational policy rule should not deviate
too much from the fully optimal state-contingent policy, both in terms of the welfare loss it
generates and when it comes to the dynamic properties of the model economy when the rule
is implemented. Second, due to time constraints, the amount of information that is allowed
in such a rule should not be too large2.
%Lopt 1 2 ;0 ;1 ;2 y;0 y;1 y;2
12:15 - - 1:88 - - 0:19 - -
8:01 0:80 - 0:76 - - 0:22 - -
7:72 0:89 - 1:1  0:49 - 0:37  0:19 -
6:70 1:8  0:80 0:83  0:75 - 0:47  0:45 -
6:35 1:8  0:82 1:0  1:2 0:32 0:27  0:03  0:20
Table 4.1: Excess loss in NEMO for optimal policy rules of varying length.
To nd the optimal implementable policy rules, I solve the relevant models numerically
in Dynare and then solve for the unconditional variances of the endogenous variables. The
optimal rule is the one that gives the smallest average of these variances as given by the loss
function. Table 4.1 shows the percentage di¤erence between the loss under the optimized
implementable rules of varying length (Loir) and the rst-best outcome attainable in NEMO
(i.e. the outcome under the optimal state-contingent policy, Lopt),
1Since ination and the output gap are non-predetermined variables in NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM,
they are not actually observable and independent of the model the rule is implemented in. However, it is
common to treat them as directly observable (see e.g. Galí 2008).
2To illustrate why the latter can be a problem, consider a crude algorithm that tests 20 values of each
parameter included in the rule. If the rule contains three parameters, this means that the loss function is
evaluated 203 = 8000 times. If there are six parameters, the number grows to 64 million.
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%Lopt = L
oir   Lopt
Lopt
: (4.2)
I call this measure the excess loss. I nd that even a two parameter rule which includes only
contemporary ination and output performs reasonably well, but adding a lagged interest rate
term decreases the excess loss by about four percentage points. Adding even more information
helps, but there is little to gain from more than eight parameters. I nd furthermore that
the impulse responses of the target variables to the most important shocks are very similar
for optimal state-contingent policy and the optimal eight parameter rule. Thus my choice
for the optimal implementable rule is
it = 1it 1 + 2it 2 + ;0t + ;1t 1 + ;2t 2 + y;0yt + y;1yt 1 + y;2yt 2: (4.3)
In principle, it is possible to improve on this specication by adding other variables that
are included in all the models. This is because the expected future target variables in the
fully optimal instrument rule can be expressed as functions of in general all the variables at
time t. However, adding additional variables to the rule only decreases the loss marginally
in NEMO. Including the real exchange rate in the three parameter optimized rule decreases
%Lopt by less than 0:01 percentage points. Reacting separately to imported and domestic
ination has a similar small e¤ect on the loss. The only endogenous variable that seems to
be worth reacting to is wage ination, but this does not gure in LGM and hence can not be
included it in the implementable rule.
It is important to note that the specication given by equation 4.3 is only used when we
need to investigate the e¤ects of the optimal NEMO policy in di¤erent non-nested models.
If we do not require that the performance of the robustied policy can be checked in the
alternative models, the optimal state-contingent policy should replace the implementable
rule.
4.1.1 The robustness of optimal policy
How well does the optimal policy from one model perform in the other models? That is, how
robust are the optimal policies? Table 4.2 shows the absolute and excess losses when using
the optimal implementable rule from one model in the other models3. Here, the excess loss
3The absolute loss is multiplied by 10:000 so that standard deviations are expressed in percentage points
instead of basis points.
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is measured by
%Loir=L
rule   Loir
Loir
; (4.4)
where Loir now is the loss under the optimal eight parameter implementable rule for the
model in question (the benchmark loss for that model). In other words, this is a measure of
the per cent increase in loss in model m when switching from a policy that is optimized for
m to a policy rule within the same class of rules optimized for an alternative model4.
Rule generated in Lrule [%Loir] evaluated in
NEMO Credit NEMO LGM NAM
NEMO 22:1 [0] 5:44 [1:85] 4:84 [41:8] 1
Credit NEMO 22:5 [1:87] 5:34 [0] 4:95 [45:0] 1
LGM 27:4 [24:0] 7:81 [46:4] 3:41 [0] 5:04 [142]
NAM 60:9 [176] 246 [4515] 28:5 [735] 2:08 [0]
Table 4.2: Loss and excess loss in one model (the rule implementing model) when using optimal policy from
another (the rule generating model).
While some rules optimized for one model can perform reasonably well in alternative
models, in other cases the resulting excess losses are huge. Thus my results support the
ndings of Levin and Williams (2003) for a di¤erent set of models. As expected, NEMO and
Credit NEMO are relatively tolerant of each others optimal policies. These models have the
same core structure and main transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. The losses in
LGM and NAM are also very similar for NEMO and Credit NEMO policy.
The most striking result is the di¤erence between the policy that is optimized for NAM
and those optimized for the other models. NAM require a more timid response to uctuations
both in ination and in the output gap, as well as less inertia, than the other models. As a
result, the excess losses in NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM are high when the optimal NAM
policy is implemented. Furthermore, NAM is unstable with optimal policy from NEMO (and,
for similar reasons, for the optimal Credit NEMO policy). This is because the optimal NEMO
rule reacts too strongly to uctuations in the output gap relative to the reaction to ination
uctuations. The problem is in the timing of the interest rate responses; the policy rate only
a¤ects output with a one period lag, and because output growth is negatively autocorrelated,
a policy of reacting strongly to output can be destabilizing instead of stabilizing. For example,
if output is high in one period, the interest rate will be increased, but then output next period
 when the policy change has an e¤ect  turns out to be low. There are no e¤ects from
4The parameters of the implementable rules for each model are given in appendix C.
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future expectations that can correct for this, and so a small initial shock can generate very
long cycles and even instability.
The rules that do well in LGM have even higher coe¢ cients on the output gap, and the
optimal NEMO and Credit NEMO policies are seen to generate excess losses above 40% in this
model. This is not catastrophic, however, something that can be attributed to the structural
similarities between LGM and the two NEMO versions. The reason why the LGM policy
rule does not create instability in NAM even though the reaction of output gap uctutations
is strong, is the stronger reaction to ination for this policy.
4.2 Method and loss measures
The catastrophic performance of the optimal NEMO policy in NAM means that it is im-
portant to nd some middle ground between this optimal rule and a rule that works better
across the alternative models. For weights  on the simple rule varying in the range [0; 1],
I calculate in NEMO the optimal implementable eight-parameter rule of the form given by
equation 4.3, when the objective function is the modied loss function given by
Lmod = E0
1X
t=0
t

(1  ) 2t + yy2t + i(it   it 1)2+ (it   ist)2	 : (4.5)
Here,  = 1 means that the optimal choice of policy is simply the simple rule given by ist ,
since following this rule mechanically gives Lmod = 0. At the other extreme,  = 0 means
that there is no loss (measured by equation 4.5) associated with straying from the simple rule,
and hence the optimal NEMO policy given by the last row of table 4.1 is the best choice. For
interior values of , the policy chosen to minimize equation 4.5 can be seen as a compromise
between the goal of minimizing the loss in NEMO and the goal of staying close to the simple
rule.
Dynare uses a numerical search algorithm that for each value of  calculates that imple-
mentable eight parameter rule which generates the smallest loss in NEMO measured by 4.55.
When I have found the optimal policy rules for a range of -values between 0 and 1, I calcu-
late the resulting losses from committing to this robustied optimal NEMO-policy forever in
NEMO, Credit NEMO, NAM and LGM. For each rule, Dynare solves the models and calcu-
lates the unconditional variances of t , yt and it. The true welfare loss is then calculated
using the original loss function given by equation 3.5 (which is equivalent to equation 4.5
5This algorithm is not part of the standard version of Dynare, but has been written by Junior Maih for
Norges Bank.
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with  = 0).
I use two di¤erent parameterizations of the loss function. The benchmark has weights
that correspond to those used by Norges Bank for calculation of optimal policy in Monetary
Policy Report no. 3, 2011 (Norges Bank 2011), namely y = 0:5 and i = 0:25. These
values reect the priority of the three objectives outlined in section 3.1, and the fact that
they have been in use by Norges Bank makes the analysis more relevant for practical policy
making in Norway. In addition, these values are within the range of values found in the
literature (see e.g. Levin and Williams 2003). As a test of the results, I repeat the analysis
in section 4.3.4 when the weight on output uctuations (y) is increased from 0:5 to 1:5.
4.2.1 Comparing losses: excess loss and implied ination premium
Simulations of the four models using the optimal implementable rule for each of them (see
table 4.2) show that the size of the loss varies considerable in magnitude across models.
The loss in NEMO is considerably higher than in all the three other models, and for NAM
the di¤erence is a whole order of magnitude. There seem to be several reasons for these
di¤erences. First, variables with the same name do not have the same denition across
models. For example, the output gap in LGM is estimated on the HP-ltered GDP series,
in NEMO the trend output is endogenously determined, and in NAM there is a constant
trend output. When the output gap used for estimating LGM is based on a linear trend, I
nd that the simulated loss can match the size of the loss from NEMO. Thus this di¤erence
might account for a large fraction of the di¤erence in losses between some of the models6.
Second, the models have been estimated on data from di¤erent sample periods. NEMO
and LGM are estimated on a sample that starts in 1993 and ends in 2011, while Credit
NEMO is estimated on a sample that goes from 1989 to 2009. Some of the equations in
NAM are estimated on samples starting in the 1980s, others on data starting in the late
1990s. If there have been structural breaks during these periods, this might inuence the size
of losses generated by the respective models.
Third, some of the variables that are exogenous in the original version of NAM have been
kept constant at their steady-state values in my simulations. Thus the variation generated
by my version of the model will underestimate the actual variation in the target variables
predicted by the original version.
Fourth, monetary policy has not been specied in the same way when the models have
been estimated. NEMO is estimated assuming that Norges Bank follows the optimal state-
contingent policy, while LGM is estimated assuming that a simple rule is being used. As long
6Ilbas et al. (2012) avoids this problem by re-estimating their models on the same data set.
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as the interest rate is a non-predetermined variable, di¤erences in the policy rules may account
for some of the di¤erence in losses. Moreover, when the original policy rule is changed, we
also remove some variation in the target variables stemming from the shock in the rule.
Fifth, some of the di¤erences might be attributable to the di¤erences in estimation
methodology. NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM are estimated with Bayesian methods, while
the equations constituting NAM are estimated with either OLS or maximum likelihood.
However, it is unclear in which way this will inuence the variance of the target variables, if
at all.
Measuring robustness using the absolute loss values would imply that when NEMO is
the reference model, there is little value in robustifying optimal policy, since the losses under
almost any policy will be lower than the loss in NEMO. Since it is unreasonable that one
of the models should predict much more variation in the target variables than the rest, we
should try to correct for the large level di¤erences by measuring the loss generated by any
particular policy rule relative to the benchmark loss in the same model. I will consider two
measures that achieve this in di¤erent ways.
The excess loss %Loir given by 4.4 provides a simple measure. It is reasonable to believe
that if the problems mentioned above were corrected for, the benchmark loss would be nearly
the same in all the four models. So what is relevant for the policymaker is arguably how well
a given rule performs relative to what can be achieved optimally in that model. This way
of comparing the performance of policy rules is used by, among others, Levin and Williams
(2003) and Levin et al. (2003).
A second measure is the so called "implied ination premium" (IIP) introduced by Küster
and Wieland (2010). IIP measures the increase in the standard deviation of t, relative to
the outcome under the optimal policy, that is required to increase the loss to the new level
while holding the standard deviations of yt and it constant. This can be expressed as
IIP =
p
Lrule   Loir + (oir )2   oir ; (4.6)
where oir is the standard deviation of t under the optimal implementable rule
7. IIP is
concave and increasing in the loss Lrule, and it is zero when Lrule = Loir. I will use this
measure as an alternative to %Loir due to the fact that the latter may create a wrong
impression of the e¤ects of alternative policies (Küster and Wieland 2010). In particular, for
models that in general create small losses (such as NAM) the change from optimal policy
tend to be overemphasized relative to models with much larger benchmark losses (such as
7As before, the standard deviations are expressed in percentage points. The IIP expression is derived in
appendix B.
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NEMO). The reason is that, say, a one percentage point increase in the standard deviation of
ination will give rise to a much larger change in %Loir when the value of the benchmark
loss Loir is small. Such an increase is in absolute terms equal to a change in the loss of 0:2
units in NEMO and 0:03 in LGM.
It is not obvious which of these two measures is the one policymakers should care more
about, even though %Loir is the more common in the robustness literature. I will in the
following avoid taking a denite stand and instead present both measures in order to get a
more complete picture of the di¤erences between policy rules and the possible gains from
robustifying optimal policy using such rules.
4.2.2 Simple rules
Due to the abundance of simple monetary policy rules in the literature8, there are many
possible substitutes for the term ist in equation 4.5. The rules that work well in this respect
should preferably generate small losses in all the models, that is, they should be quite robust
to model uncertainty in themselves. It is particularly acute that they yield a good perfor-
mance in models that are not tolerant of the optimal NEMO policy (such as NAM), since we
need the simple rule to be an e¤ective insurance against instability and/or high losses caused
by the optimal NEMO policy.
In addition, the rules should be quite fault tolerant to the particular choice of weight . I
denote by fault tolerance in this context the degree to which the excess losses are acceptable
for -values in a neighbourhood of the optimal value9. High fault tolerance means that it is
less likely that the policymaker will "miss" when choosing the value of ; that is, the cost of
not setting  at the optimum is not too high. Furthermore, the weight should not be required
to be too high. If that is the case, it is probably better to use the simple rule itself, without
recourse to optimal policy in NEMO.
A selection of simple rules along with the values of %Loir and IIP generated in the four
models is given in table 4.3. All these rules can be written on the general form
it = it 1 + (1  )

t + yyt

: (4.7)
Thus the interest rate is set based on the current year-on-year ination rate and the output
gap, and might to some extent also depend on its own lag. I will refer to rules that include
8For a survey, see Taylor (1999) and Taylor and Williams (2010).
9Fault tolerance can also be measured with respect to the parameter values in a policy rule (Levin and
Williams 2003).
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all three terms as "three parameter rules", while rules in which the restriction that  = 0 is
imposed are called "two parameter rules". The latter class includes the Taylor rule discussed
in section 3.3. When the simple rules are written on the form of equation 4.7, the terms inside
the bracket parenthesis correspond to the long run reactions to ination and the output gap.
This makes it easy to compare the reaction coe¢ cients in the two and three parameter rules.
The simple rules I use as cross-checks on optimal policy can be divided roughly into two
categories. First, the Taylor rule is a prominent example of a simple ad hoc rule that is not
optimized in any way, but is thought to function well in a variety of contexts or for some
specic purpose. Second, I consider rules that are optimized for the models at hand, namely
the Bayesian rules with two (Bayes2) and three (Bayes3) parameters, and the minmax rule.
An explanation of these rules and how they are constructed is given below. I also look briey
at some alternative optimized rules that will test the robustness of the results to the measure
used for comparison of losses across models, namely Bayesian rules that are optimized for
absolute losses instead of excess losses (Bayes2abs and Bayes3abs)10.
Rule %Loir [IIP]
  y NEMO Credit NEMO LGM NAM
Taylor   1:5 0:5 25:4 [0:806] 57:4 [0:875] 136 [1:19] 34:8 [0:365]
Bayes2   1:96 0:59 11:5 [0:387] 28:5 [0:488] 95:8 [0:900] 59:4 [0:565]
Bayes3 0:63 2:87 1:68 13:7 [0:458] 28:2 [0:484] 25:7 [0:291] 48:4 [0:479]
Bayes2abs   2:16 0:65 10:0 [0:340] 24:3 [0:425] 87:7 [0:838] 76:1 [0:686]
Bayes3abs 0:66 3:53 1:98 9:67 [0:329] 20:6 [0:368] 26:1 [0:294] 60:6 [0:574]
minmax 0:61 2:65 1:52 14:8 [0:491] 30:3 [0:515] 28:2 [0:322] 43:4 [0:438]
Table 4.3: List of simple rules and their performance (in terms of excess loss and IIP) in the four models.
The parameters in the rules, except those in the Taylor rule and the minmax rule, have been shortened in
the table.
4.3 Robustifying optimal policy
4.3.1 The Taylor rule
There are at least two reasons why it is better to use simple rules found to be robust in the
literature. First, if the rules have been shown to function well in other models than the ones
I consider, they will be more robust to the kind of model uncertainty I am interested in.
Second, such rules will generally be known and trusted by decision-makers, and this may in
10All the Bayesian rules are derived by Hoen (2012).
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itself motivate their use for cross-checking and make departures from optimal policy easier
to accept. This second point applies especially to the Taylor rule, which is probably known
by any student of macroeconomics and anyone familiar with central banking. Indeed, there
is evidence that policymakers use this rule as a guideline by which to measure their interest
rate setting. As Asso et al. (2010) put it,
Taylor-type rules have become the standard by which monetary policy is intro-
duced in macroeconomic models both small and large. They have been used to
explain how policy has been set in the past and how policy should be set in
the future. Indeed, they serve as benchmarks for policymakers in assessing the
current stance of monetary policy and in determining a future policy path.
For these reasons, the Taylor rule is a natural starting point and benchmark for my
analysis.
The excess losses (measured by %Loir) and the implied ination premia (IIP) in the
four models for values of  varying between 0 and 1 are plotted in gure 4.1. These are the
loss curves for the individual models. When  = 0, the policy is fully optimized for NEMO,
and when  = 1, it is simply the Taylor rule. Since lower values of  means that the policy
rule will be closer to the optimal NEMO policy, the loss curve for NEMO is increasing in
. Measured by the excess loss, NEMO is the most fault tolerant of the four models, as it
generates smaller values of%Loir for all values of . This is partly due to the fact that for all
but the highest weight on the simple rule, the robustied policy is to some extent optimized
for NEMO, but it is also because NEMO seems to be more tolerant than the alternative
models of deviations in parameter values from the optimal ones11. In terms of IIP, the loss
curve for NEMO is less at and more similar to the one for Credit NEMO.
For the alternative models, the picture is mixed. While the loss curves for Credit NEMO
have similar shapes as those for NEMO, both NAM and LGM display a di¤erent pattern.
NAM is unstable when the optimal NEMO policy is followed, and the loss generated by this
model seems to increase strictly towards1 when  ! 0. Hence there is a clear advantage in
placing some weight on the simple rule when the policymaker has some belief in NAM. As
opposed to this, the loss in LGM is much higher for the Taylor rule than for optimal NEMO
policy. The reason for this high excess loss is that optimal policy in LGM entails a strong
reaction to uctuations in the output gap, and the model is relatively fault intolerant with
respect to deviations from this aspect of the policy rule. In fact, when the response to output
is too weak, the Blanchard-Kahn conditions are not satised due to instability. This feature
is not found in the other models.
11See Hoen (2012) for a discussion of this kind of fault tolerance.
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Figure 4.1: Excess loss %Loir and IIP, respectively, as functions of the weight  on the Taylor rule in the
modied loss function.
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This method for robustifying optimal NEMO policy works best if the individual losses
are close to their minimum values for the same -value. That is, the regions of high fault
tolerance should be overlapping. When the Taylor rule is the robustifying simple rule, this
holds to a certain extent. Increasing the weight on the simple Taylor rule leads to higher
excess losses in NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM, but lower in NAM. However, NAM is
relatively fault tolerant for -values in the interval between 0:2 and 1, so placing only a small
weight on the Taylor rule in the modied loss function is enough to insure policy against
catastrophic outcomes should NAM be the correct model.
How much should the policymaker care about deviations from the simple rule? Clearly,
which value of  is optimal depends on how much condence the policymaker has in the each
of the models. Following Cateau (2007), Küster and Wieland (2010) and Brock et al. (2003),
I combine the Bayesian approach with the minmax approach in order to calculate what I
call the weighted excess loss. This can be seen as an operationalization of the policymakers
preferences when there is uncertainty about which model is correct, and it is given by (Küster
and Wieland 2010)
LWex = (1  e)
X
m2M
pm%Loirm + emax
m2M
%Loirm ; (4.8)
where pm is the probability that model m in the set M ={NEMO, Credit NEMO, LGM,
NAM} is the correct one, %Loirm is the weighted excess loss in model m, and e is the
"degree of desired insurance" against the worst case outcome. Thus e can be seen as a
measure of the aversion to model uncertainty (as described in section 3.4.1).The function
LWex nests the Bayesian and minmax loss functions as special cases: when e = 0 , I call the
preferences "pure Bayesian", while e = 1 entails "pure minmax" preferences12. For all values
e > 0, a higher weight is implicitly assigned to the model that generates the largest excess
loss; for example, when NAM is the worst case model, the total weight given to NAM is
(1   e)pNAM + e. pm and e can either be set on a purely subjective basis or updated using
Bayestheorem after the models have been tested against data. In the following I consider
several combinations of these parameters.
The objective is to choose the value of  that minimizes LWex for given preference parame-
ters. The upper panel of gure 4.2 plots LWex for  2 [0; 1] and for di¤erent values of e and
the probability pNEMO. Since NEMO is the reference model and the one used to calculate
optimal policy, it is natural that the probability assigned to it is higher than the probability
assigned to any of the other models. For simplicity, an equal probability is given to each of
12The robust control framework assumes that preferences are pure minmax.
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Figure 4.2: Weighted excess loss %Loir (upper panel) and weighted IIP (lower panel) as functions of the
weight  on the Taylor rule in the modied loss function. The blue lines show the value of the excess loss
when e=0, the red lines when e=0.5 and the green line when e=1. The solid lines are for pNEMO = 0:4,
while the dashed lines are for pNEMO = 0:8. The black circles mark the minima.
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the alternative models. From the gure we can see that the optimal weight is in the range
0:1   0:2 regardless of the specic probabilities. In any case,  should be close to the value
at which the loss curves of LGM and NAM cross in gure 4.1.
As an alternative specication of the policymakers preferences, let the weighted IIP be
given by
LWIIP = (1  e)
X
m2M
pmIIPm + emax
m2M
IIPm; (4.9)
where IIPm is the IIP in model m. The lower panel of gure 4.2 plots LWIIP as a function
of . When IIP is the relevant measure, the performance of the Taylor rule (i.e.  = 1) in
NEMO relative to its performance in the other models is worse. Still, the optimal weight is
almost unchanged at around 0:1, so this result seems to be relatively robust to the choice of
loss measure. In both cases, the focus is on avoiding instability in NAM while not creating
too much variation in the alternative models.
It is evident from gure 4.1 that these conclusions depend heavily on the weight placed on
NAM. Since the loss curves for all the other models have their minima at  = 0, the optimal
value of  is zero if the policymaker cares neither about the worst case nor about NAM at
all. However, raising either pNAM or e to 0:08 implies that the optimal weight rises to 0:1.
Thus the policymaker can optimally place some weight on the simple rule even if he does not
have a lot of condence in NAM. At the same time, the optimal weight rises if either LGM
or Credit NEMO is given no consideration.
4.3.2 Bayesian rules
The Bayesian rules minimize the average of the excess model losses in NAM, Credit NEMO
and LGM. An equal probability is assigned to each of the three models, and the loss generated
in each model is weighted by the inverse of the loss in that model under the optimal simple
rule of the same class for the same model. The Bayesian, or averaged, loss function in this
case is
LB =
1
3
LNAM
LNAM;osr
+
1
3
LCNEMO
LCNEMO;osr
+
1
3
LLGM
LLGM;osr
(4.10)
Lm is the loss generated by the Bayesian rule in model m, while Lm;osr is the optimal simple
rule loss in the same model13. For example, for the three parameter Bayesian rule, the
13The results do not depend noticeably on whether each model loss is weighted by the optimal simple rule
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e¤ective weight given to NAM in 4.10 is one third times the inverse of the loss generated
by NAM when the optimal simple three parameter rule for NAM is implemented, LNAM;osr.
Below I cross-check the results with rules that minimize an average of the unweighted losses.
The reference version of NEMO is left out of this optimization. It would be possible
also to include NEMO in the minimization of LB, but I leave it out because NEMO is the
reference model under which optimal policy is calculated. This way I avoid giving NEMO
weight both in the derivation of the simple robust rule and in the calculation of the optimal
implementable policy, and the results will be more clear-cut (Ilbas et al. 2012).
The Bayesian rules can potentially generate smaller losses than the Taylor rule in both
Credit NEMO, NAM and LGM, since these rules are optimized to function well in just these
models. I use two types of simple Bayesian rules, one that only includes current ination and
output, and one that also includes the lagged interest rate. The two parameter rule facilitates
comparisons with the results using the standard Taylor rule, since it includes the same type
of information. The three parameter rule provides more exibility and allows for some degree
of inertia. For this reason, it will generate a smaller loss in at least one of the three models.
The gain from adding more than three parameters turns out to be small compared to the
gain of going from two to three, and for this reason I only consider these two specications.
Another restriction is that I only analyze rules that are optimal for a loss function that
gives equal weight to the losses in each of the models. This simplication is done for two
reasons. First, it would be too far-reaching to do the analysis in this section for several rules
derived from Bayesian loss functions with di¤erent weights. Second, constructing Bayesian
rules using other weights on the models is easy when the basic framework is given, and it can
be done by the policymaker if needed (see Hoen 2012 for a discussion of such rules). In any
case, the rules I do consider have the potential to function well for cross-checking purposes
even when we do not weight the models equally.
Comparing the Bayesian rules to the optimal two and three parameter rules for each
model separately (see table 4.4 and table 4.3), we see that the parameters in the Bayesian
rules can be viewed as averages of the corresponding parameters that are optimal in each
individual model. For example, the coe¢ cient on the lagged interest rate, , in the Bayesian
three parameter rule is lower than the corresponding ones in the optimal three parameter
rules for NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM, but higher than the one in the optimal NAM
rule. Thus the presence of NAM makes the Bayesian policy less history dependent than
what would be the case if only Credit NEMO and LGM were given weight in the Bayesian
loss function. In general, the coe¢ cients in the Bayesian rules have values in between the
(two or three parameters) loss or the optimal eight parameter rule loss, as this is mostly a matter of scaling.
Hoen (2012) uses the former.
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Model   y
NEMO   1:88 0:19
NEMO 0:80 3:87 1:14
Credit NEMO   3:08 0:57
Credit NEMO 0:96 22:2 8:36
LGM   2:19 1:76
LGM 0:80 4:46 5:08
NAM   1:12 0:35
NAM 0:34 1:16 0:55
Table 4.4: Optimal three parameter rules in each of the individual models. Taken from Hoen (2012).
most extreme ones found in the rules that are optimal for the models individually.
The two parameter rule
As can be seen in table 4.3, the two parameter rule has coe¢ cients that are not very di¤erent
from those in the Taylor rule, although it is a bit more aggressive on both ination and
output. For each of the models except NAM, the excess loss is smaller when we allow the
parameter values to be optimized. As in the case of the Taylor rule, and for similar reasons,
LGM has the worst performance of all the models when the Bayesian rule is implemented.
Increasing the coe¢ cient on the output gap in order to create a smaller loss in LGM will
involve too large an increase in the losses arising in NAM and Credit NEMO.
Figure 4.3 plots %Loir as a function of the weight  on the two parameter Bayesian
rule in the modied loss function. The loss curves have similar shapes to the corresponding
ones when the Taylor rule is used as a cross-check on optimal NEMO policy (this is also the
case for the IIP loss curves, which are not shown). The losses in NEMO, Credit NEMO and
LGM increase strictly with , while the loss curve for NAM has a u-shape with a minimum
at around  = 0:3. Again, the only reason for placing a weight on the simple rule is the need
to insure against a high loss should NAM be the correct model.
The optimal weight on the two parameter Bayesian rule is in the same region as for the
Taylor rule when the probabilites assigned to the various models in equation 4.8 are the same.
Furthermore, the weighted excess loss is also on the same level. For example, the minimum
value of LWex when e = 0 and pNEMO = 0:4 is 28:2 when the Taylor rule is used, and 27:5
when the two parameter Bayesian rule is used. This suggests that the Taylor rule can provide
almost as good insurance as a rule within the same class that is optimized for these models.
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Figure 4.3: Excess loss %Loir as a function of the weight  on the two parameter Bayesian rule in the
modied loss function.
The three parameter rule
In the three parameter Bayesian rule, the long run reaction coe¢ cients are higher than for
both the Taylor rule and the two parameter Bayesian rule. This can mainly be attributed to
Credit NEMO, in which the optimal three parameter rule is very aggressive on uctuations
in both ination and the output gap. Coincidentally, the three parameter Bayesian rule is
fairly similar to the optimal NEMO rule, even though NEMO is not part of the calculation of
this policy. Hence the Bayesian rule performs well in NEMO, evaluated either with %Loir
or IIP.
As can be seen in gure 4.4, for every alternative model except NAM and for all -
values strictly greater than 0, the excess losses are strictly lower for the three parameter rule
than for the two parameter rule. The same is the case for the IIP. The gain is particularly
large in LGM: allowing for interest rate smoothing in the Bayesian rule decreases %Loir in
this model by 70 percentage points. The reason is that there is less of a trade-o¤ between
stabilization in NAM and in LGM when we allow the interest rate to depend on its own
history. Put di¤erently, it is less costly in terms of the loss in NAM to reduce the loss in
LGM. NAM is now the worst case model for all values of . Nevertheless, the three parameter
Bayesian rule still performs better than the two parameter rule in this model.
This has several implications for how well the three parameter Bayesian rule functions
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Figure 4.4: Excess loss %Loir and IIP, respectively, as functions of the weight  on the three parameter
Bayesian rule in the modied loss function.
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compared to the two parameter rules. There are three main di¤erences. First, with the
expection of NAM, all the models are more fault tolerant with respect to changes in the
value of  from its optimal value. In stark contrast to gure 4.1, gure 4.4 shows that the
loss in LGM is now nearly the same for every value of . Therefore also the weighted excess
loss and IIP are less sensitive to deviations of  from its optimal value, as can be seen in
gure 4.5.
Second, a higher weight on the simple rule is optimal, and this optimal -value is more
sensitive to the policymakers preferences over the various models. More specically,  should
now be in the region 0:2 0:6 if no extra insurance against the worst case outcome is required.
This is because the regions of high fault tolerance for the individual models overlap at higher
values of . The optimal weight on the simple rule increases sharply with the value of e in
equation 4.8, and for a moderate degree of insurance against the worst case (e = 0:5),   0:9
is appropriate. This result can be attributed to the fact that NAM is the worst case model
for all -values, since the loss in NAM decreases monotonically up to   0:9. However, due
to the high fault tolerance of all the models, a weight on the simple rule closer to the values
that are optimal for the Taylor rule is not catastrophic, at least when the preferences are
not pure minmax (e = 1). Furthermore, which -value is optimal not only depends on the
probabilities assigned to the models, but also on whether %Loir or IIP is considered to be
the most important measure of performance. Generally, IIP implies a lower optimal weight
than does %Loir.
Third, the minimum weighted loss is lower, but the di¤erence is not huge. As an example,
consider the preferences given by e = 0, pNEMO = 0:4 and an equal weight on the three other
models. The minimum weighted loss is 23% lower in terms of %Loir and 17% lower in
terms of IIP when the three parameter Bayesian rule is used than when the Taylor rule is
used. The di¤erence is comparable for other values of pNEMO, but it increases with e.
Overall, I nd that the most important gain in using a three parameter Bayesian rule
rather than the Taylor rule in the modied loss function is that the fault tolerance of the
aggregate loss with respect to  is higher. In other words, there is less of a danger that
the policymaker will put too low or too high a weight on the simple rule when this rule is
the three parameter Bayesian rule. Again, these results depend heavily on the amount of
condence the policymaker has in NAM. However, the Bayesian rules are constructed by
placing an equal weight on the excess loss in each of the alternative models. If the condence
the policymaker has in each model is revised, the Bayesian rules should also be changed.
The choice of weight on the simple rule can be seen as a choice between di¤erent com-
binations of loss in the reference model and losses in the alternative models. Figure 4.6
plots the weighted excess loss for the three alternative models, with an equal weight on each
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Figure 4.5: Weighted excess loss %Loir (upper panel) and weighted IIP (lower panel) as functions of the
weight  on the three parameter Bayesian rule in the modied loss function. The blue lines show the value
of the excess loss when e=0, the red lines when e=0.5 and the green line when e=1. The solid lines are for
pNEMO = 0:4, while the dashed lines are for pNEMO = 0:8. The black circles mark the minima.
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Figure 4.6: Weighted excess loss in the alternative models versus excess loss in NEMO for the Taylor rule
and the two and three parameter Bayesian rules. The excess loss in each alternative model is given equal
weight.
model loss, against the excess loss in NEMO. Seperate lines show the results for the Taylor
rule and the two Bayesian rules. Points on each of the lines represent di¤erent trade-o¤s
between the excess loss in NEMO and that in the alternative models. For example, should
the policymaker be willing to accept a 2% premium on the loss in NEMO in order to gain
insurance against other possible models, the weighted excess loss from the alternative models
will be close to 38% if the Bayesian three parameter rule is used, and 47% if the Taylor rule is
used. Evidently, lower values on both axes are preferred, and hence moving along the graph
in the north-east direction can never be optimal. If the policymaker is willing to accept the
possibility of large losses in the alternative models in order to get a lower loss in NEMO (i.e.
for low values on the horizontal axis), there is not much of a di¤erence between the rules.
On the other hand, if a somewhat higher loss in NEMO can be acceptable to the extent
that it will yield lower losses in the other models, the Bayesian three parameter rule clearly
outperform both of the two parameter rules. Furthermore, if any of the latter are used, we
risk choosing too high a weight  and end up with a higher loss both in NEMO and in the
other models. This is just another manifestation of the higher fault tolerance under the three
parameter optimized rules.
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Figure 4.7: Excess loss %Loir as a function of the weight  on the alternative three parameter Bayesian
rule in the modied loss function.
Alternative Bayesian rules
As a cross-check on the results presented above, I consider also Bayesian rules that are
optimized for the Bayesian loss function given by
LB2 =
1
3
LNAM +
1
3
LCNEMO +
1
3
LLGM : (4.11)
Here, the losses in the individual models are not weighted by the inverse of the respective
losses under the optimal simple policy rules. Compared to the loss function 4.10, this alter-
native Bayesian loss gives more weight to Credit NEMO than to LGM and NAM, and more
weight to LGM than to NAM. This is because LCNEMO;osr > LLGM;osr > LNAM;osr.
The resulting two and three parameter rules are given in table 4.3 (Bayes2abs and
Bayes3abs, respectively). The coe¢ cients turn out to be similar to the corresponding ones
in the original Bayesian rules, and the two sets of rules also have similar properties when it
comes to robustication of optimal policy. The similarities can be seen in gure 4.7, which
plots %Loir as a function of  when the alternative three parameter rule is used for cross-
checking. As expected, the rule that minimizes LB2 generate a smaller loss in Credit NEMO
and higher losses in LGM and NAM than does the rule that minimizes LB. The reason is
that the loss generated in Credit NEMO carries a higher weight in the former loss function.
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However, which of the Bayesian three parameter rules is used does not matter a lot. The
loss curves have the same form, and NAM is still the worst case model for all weights .
Furthermore, both the optimal value of  and the minimum weighted loss are very similar
for the two rules, at least when the preferences are not pure minmax. This indicates that the
general conclusions for the Bayesian rules are robust to the precise size of the probabilities
assigned to each model when we minimize the average loss.
4.3.3 The minmax rule
The minmax rule is a simple instrument rule that minimizes the largest excess loss given by
any of the models I consider. Thus the objective function can be written
Lmm = max

LNAM
LNAM;osr
;
LCNEMO
LCNEMO;osr
;
LLGM
LLGM;osr

; (4.12)
where the maximization is done with respect to the three relative model losses in the paren-
thesis14. Since I measure the losses in each model relative to these optimal losses, I avoid
the problem of minmax rules being overly sensitive to the benchmark loss in the individual
models (Levin and Williams 2003).
As there is no function in Dynare for nding minmax rules, I have used my own algorithm
written for Matlab15. First I check the losses generated in each model for a wide grid of
coe¢ cient values. Then I narrow in on the areas which seem to contain the minimum for the
objective function Lmm (that is, the smallest maximum excess loss across the three models).
This method gives convergence on a set of parameter values in the rule.
The resulting three parameter minmax rule is given in table 4.3. The maximum excess
loss is 43:4%, which is generated by this rule in NAM. Even though NAM is still the worst
case model, the loss is lower for this rule than for any of the other rules. Compared to the
three parameter Bayesian rule, the coe¢ cients in the minmax rule are all smaller, making
it perform better in NAM. However, this also ensures that it will generate a higher loss in
Credit NEMO and LGM.
Despite the very di¤erent criteria, given by equations 4.10 and 4.12, the Bayesian rule
and the minmax rule have remarkably similar properties when it comes to robustication.
This can be seen in gure 4.8. The loss curves for the individual models have the same shape
as before: NAM is the worst case model for all values of , LGM is very fault tolerant, and
14Minimization of this objective function is equivalent to minimization of the largest excess loss %Loir
across the three models.
15The code is available on request.
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Figure 4.8: Excess loss %Loir as a function of the weight  on the minmax rule in the modied loss
function.
both NEMO and Credit NEMO have loss curves that are increasing in . All the models
are fault tolerant for values of  that are not too low. Furthermore, the optimal -value is
almost identical to that found for the three parameter Bayesian rule when the preferences are
pure Bayesian. When some extra consideration is given to the worst case, the minmax rule
performs better than the Bayesian rule. This is expected, as by construction the minmax
rule dominates all other three parameter rules when the policymaker only cares about the
maximum loss. Altogether, I nd that the minmax rule does at least as well as the three
parameter Bayesian rule for any preferences.
Figure 4.9 plots the maximum excess loss in the alternative models against the excess loss
in NEMO for both the Taylor rule and the minmax rule. In this case, we see that it might
actually be better to use one of the two parameter rules for robustication if the policymaker
will accept an excess loss in NEMO no higher than 2%. However, as shown before, this comes
at the expense of lower fault tolerance with respect to the weight .
To check the robustness of the results for the minmax rule to the specication of the
losses in the minmax loss function 4.12, I have also found a rule that minimizes the largest
IIP across the three alternative models. This rule has the form
it = 0:57it + (1  0:57) [2:63t + 1:30yt] : (4.13)
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Figure 4.9: Maximum excess loss in the alternative models versus excess loss in NEMO for the Taylor rule
and the minmax rule.
Compared to the minmax rule for excess losses, this rule displays less inertia in the interest
rate and a smaller reaction to the output gap, and it generates a higher (absolute) loss in
LGM and a lower one in Credit NEMO. Still, this rule is similar enough to the original
minmax rule that its performance as a cross-check in the modied loss function is also very
similar. Thus I nd that the results are not heavily dependent on whether the excess loss or
the IIP is used in the minmax objective function.
4.3.4 An alternative loss function
The robustness of the results above can be checked by repeating the analysis for a di¤erent
parameterization of the loss function. I consider only one alternative specication mainly
due to time and space constraints, but also because changing the weight i on uctuations
in the change in the interest rate seems to give results close to the benchmark case.
In the alternative loss function, the weight on the variance of the output gap is increased
from y = 0:5 to y = 1:5. Thus this objective gives priority to output stabilization over ina-
tion stabilization. It is not supposed to represent a realistic description of the policymakers
actual preferences, but is rather a means to test whether the method for robustication of
optimal policy is viable also if the preferences deviate substantially from the benchmark.
The three parameter Bayesian rule is now given by
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Figure 4.10: Alternative loss function. Excess loss %Loir as a function of the weight  on the Taylor rule
in the modied loss function.
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Figure 4.11: Alternative loss function. Excess loss %Loir as a function of the weight  on the three
parameter Bayesian rule in the modied loss function.
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it = 0:68it 1 + (1  0:68) [2:69t + 2:38yt] : (4.14)
Comparing this rule to the three parameter Bayesian rule for the benchmark loss function, we
see that the major di¤erence is a stronger reaction to the output gap, while the coe¢ cients
on interest rate smoothing and ination are similar.
Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show the results for the Taylor rule and the three parameter Bayesian
rule, respectively. One di¤erence from the benchmark loss function is that the optimal imple-
mentable NEMO policy calculated with this alternative objective does not create instability
in NAM. However, the excess loss %Loir for the pure NEMO policy (  = 0) is still very
high, so there is also here a huge gain from putting some weight on a simple rule in the
modied loss function. Furthermore, the general conclusions given for the benchmark loss
function still hold for the alternative loss. For both simple rules, the weighted excess loss
and the weighted IIP have minima at approximately the same value of  as before. For the
Taylor rule, the optimal value of  is still between 0:1 and 0:2. For the Bayesian rule, it is
between 0:5 and 1. However, the weighted loss is for both simple rules less fault tolerant for
this alternative objective, even more so when e > 0.
4.3.5 Weighting simple rules and optimal policy
The approach of the previous section can be contrasted with a somewhat simpler method for
robustication of optimal policy. Let ist be a simple rule, and let the optimal implementable
policy in the reference model be iNEMOt . Then we can construct a new policy rule given by
it = (1  )iNEMOt + ist ; (4.15)
where  2 [0; 1]. This rule species an interest rate as a simple average of the rate given by
the optimal NEMO policy, iNEMOt , and the rate given by a simple rule, i
s
t .
Figure 4.12 plots the losses in the four models as functions of the weight , evaluated
with the benchmark loss function. The endpoints at  = 0 and  = 1 correspond exactly
to the points at  = 0 and  = 1, respectively. By placing a small weight on the Bayesian
rule we can achieve the goal of insuring against instability and a very large loss in NAM.
Furthermore, the loss curves have the same shapes as those in gure 4.4, and the optimal
weight  lies in the same region as the optimal weight .
While this approach is simpler and more straightforward than the method that involves
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Figure 4.12: Simple weighting of optimal NEMO policy and simple three parameter Bayesian rule. Excess
loss as a function of the weight  on the simple rule.
the modied loss function, a major drawback is that it is not possible to combine it with
the optimal state-contingent NEMO policy, since it is practically impossible to express the
fully optimal policy as a direct instrument rule for such a large and complicated model. It is
unlikely that any central bank will commit itself to following a complicated instrument rule.
In practice, monetary policy analysis in Norges Bank combines information from a range
of sources outside of NEMO. Forecasts of central variables such as ination and the policy
rate are made conditional on this extra-model information (Alstadheim et al. 2010). The
modied loss function ts nicely into this approach, but it is hard to implement extra-model
judgement in the same way using simple weighting of rules.
4.4 Discussion of results and conclusion
I have shown that putting some weight on a simple rule in the modied loss function given
by equation 4.5 can provide an e¤ective insurance against unwanted outcomes should the
reference model NEMO be incorrect. The method is e¤ective even when a very simple and
ad hoc instrument rule like the Taylor rule is used, but there is nevertheless a gain in terms
of fault tolerance if we both allow for interest rate smoothing and optimize the rule for
the alternative models. It has little importance whether we use the Bayesian rule  which
minimizes an average of the losses in the three alternative models  or the minmax rule 
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which minimizes the maximum loss across these three models. Thus the e¤ectiveness of the
method is not heavily dependent on the precise coe¢ cients in the simple rule. Furthermore,
the results seem to be robust to changes in the relative weights in the welfare loss function.
Which weight on the simple rule that is optimal depends on the type of rule used and
the degree of insurance against the worst case that is wanted. Generally, the optimized three
parameter rules require a higher weight than the rules without interest rate smoothing, and
a higher degree of insurance against the worst case outcome means that the optimal weight
rises. For pure Bayesian preferences, a weight between 0:1 and 0:4 is acceptable no matter
which simple rule is used. If the desired degree of insurance against the worst case is higher,
the optimal weight on the optimized three parameter rules increases while the optimal weight
on the Taylor rule is basically unchanged. Thus the recommended weight is more dependent
on which simple rule is in use if the policymaker cares about the worst case scenario.
Overall, I nd that the proposed method for robustication of optimal policy using the
modied loss function is indeed a way to insure against bad outcomes should an alternative
model provide a better description of reality than the reference model. This method can
be seen as a way of putting the concept of simple rules as "guidelines" into a coherent
optimizing framework. Instead of following either a simple rule or a fully optimal policy
for a single model mechanically, we ensure that deviations from the optimal policy are in a
sense "optimal", since they are intended to avoid bad outcomes should the reference model
be wrong. Placing some weight on a simple, robust rule in the modied loss function is
a simple way of incorporating extraneous information  information that does not come
from the reference model  into the policy making prosess. Thus the idea of using simple
rules as guidelines is not "incomplete and too vague to be operational" (Svensson 2003).
Moreover, while it is true that "commitment to an instrument rule does not leave any room
for judgemental adjustments and extra-model information" (Svensson 2003), using such a
rule together with the optimal state-contingent policy from the reference model does indeed
make it possible to incorporate information about other models.
Furthermore, the method is general enough to allow for changes over time both in which
simple rules that should be used and in which weight to put on them. If, for example, the
policymaker comes to lose condence in LGM and gain condence in another model, he
can simply adjust the simple rule accordingly and recalculate the robustied optimal policy.
Thus the method is simple to implement in practice, even under changing circumstances.
Since central banks around the world, and Norges Bank in particular, already implement
optimal policy calculations as part of their decision making process, the method is very much
a practical solution to the problem of robustness.
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4.4.1 Possible extensions
There are many possible extensions to the approach I have used in this thesis. Here I will
mention only three issues. First, I have assumed that the policymaker is able to commit
fully to a policy rule in the initial period; that is, this commitment is believed by the private
sector and will actually be carried out in all future periods. This is clearly unrealistic. Norges
Banks policy decisions are based to some extent on discretion, and there are from time to
time revisions of both models and the loss function. This problem could be partly ameliorated
by implementing the incomplete commitment approach of Debortoli et al. (2011).
Second, the approach using non-nested models could be combined with the robust control-
approach to consider also specication errors in the reference model, in the manner of Cogley
et al. (2011). For example, we could surround NEMOwith a set of models that are reasonably
close to it  in the sense that the structural properties are the same  but have di¤erent
parameter values and/or shocks. These alternative versions of NEMO might represent actual
uncertainty in the estimates of the parameters and standard deviations of shocks. With both
nested and non-nested models at hand, we could for example investigate whether policies
that are robust to models close to NEMO are also robust to models that have very di¤erent
properties.
Third, my approach leaves no room for learning over time on the part of the policymaker.
In reality, after observing data we would be better suited to judge the relative merits of
the models. This new knowledge could be used to update the probabilities placed on these
models in the Bayesian loss function and in the weighted loss function. For example, if
NEMO repeatedly turned out to outperform the alternative models in forecasting ination
and the output gap, we could gradually give more weight to this model when deciding on a
policy.
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Appendix A
Complete models
The complete versions of NEMO, LGM and NAM, along with a description of variable names,
is given below. Credit NEMO is not included, as this model is very similar to NEMO.
Parameter values are not given except for LGM, which has been re-estimated as part of this
thesis. Foreign variables in Credit NEMO, NAM and LGM are modelled as in NEMO to the
extent that this is possible (see chapter 2). All variables except growth rates and interest
rates are in logs, and in NEMO, Credit NEMO and LGM they are also deviations from the
respective (log) steady state values.
A.1 NEMO
A.1.1 List of variables
yt output gap
yt foreign GDP
ct total consumption
csat consumption savers
cspt consumption spenders
at nal good
tt intermediate good production
qt domestically produced intermediate goods used in production of the nal good
mt imported intermediate goods used in production of the nal good
75
mt exported intermediate goods
lt labour hours
kt capital stock
ut utilization rate of capital
invt capital investments
invoilt oil investments
gt government spending
t quarterly annualized CPI ination
t quarterly annualized foreign ination
Qt quarterly ination on domestic intermediate goods
Mt quarterly ination on imported intermediate goods
M

t quarterly ination on exported intermediate goods
Wt quarterly nominal wage ination
pQt real price on domestic intermediate goods
pMt real price on imported intermediate goods
pM

t real price on exported intermediate goods
wt real wage
mct real marginal costs
mct foreign real marginal costs
mrst marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
iq;t quarterly domestic nominal interest rate
iq;t quarterly foreign nominal interest rate
rKt real return to capital
st quarterly real exchange rate
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bt domestic holdings of foreign bonds
!t elasticity of substitution between labour inputs
Ht elasticity of substitution between domestically produced intermediates
Ft elasticity of substitution between foreign intermediates used in domestic production
F

t elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediates in foreign production
t share of domestic intermediates used in domestic production
t share of foreign intermediates used in foreign production
Zt shock to the growth rate of technology
zLt temporary labour augmenting productivity shock
zIt shock to investments
zBt risk premium shock
zUt shock to consumption preferences
zMt shock to imports
A.1.2 Model
Final goods
at = qt + (1  )mt (A.1)
qt = at   pQt (A.2)
mt = at   pMt (A.3)
mt = y

t   [pM

t + f51(p
M
t   st)] 

1  

t (A.4)
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Intermediate goods
Production
tt = f61(lt + z
L
t ) + f62[ut + kt 1   Zt ] (A.5)
kt =
inv
k
invt + f81(kt 1   Zt ) (A.6)
rKt = mct +
1

(tt   (ut + kt 1   Zt )) (A.7)
mct = wt +
1

(lt   tt) + 1  

zLt (A.8)
invt + 
Z
t   kt 1 = f111(invt 1 + Zt 1   kt 2) + f112Et

invt+1 + 
Z
t+1   kt
	
(A.9)
  f113Et

(iq;t   t+1)  f114rKt+1
	  f115Et zIt+1   zIt 	
Uut = r
K
t (A.10)
Domestic prices
Qt =

(1 + )
Et
Q
t+1 +
1
(1 + )
Qt 1 + f131(mct   pQt )  f132Ht (A.11)
Qt = t + p
Q
t   pQt 1 (A.12)
Export prices
M

t =

1 + 
Et
M
t+1 +
1
1 + 
M

t 1 + f151(mct   pM

t   st)  f152F

t (A.13)
M

t = 

t + p
M
t   pM

t 1 (A.14)
Import prices
Mt =

1 + 
Et
M
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Mt 1 + f171(mc

t   pMt + st)  f172Ft (A.15)
Mt = t + p
M
t   pMt 1 (A.16)
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Households
csat = f191Etc
sa
t+1 + f192c
sa
t 1   f193Et fiq;t   t+1g   f194Zt + f195zUt (A.17)
st = f201Etst+1   Et fiq;t   t+1g+ Et

iq;t   t+1
	
+ zBt (A.18)
mrst = lt + f211(
Zcsat   bccsat 1) + f212Zt (A.19)
cspt = wt + lt (A.20)
Wage-setting
Wt =

1 + 
Et
W
t+1 +
1
1 + 
Wt 1   f231(wt  mrst)  f232!t (A.21)
Wt = t + wt   wt 1 + Zt (A.22)
Market clearing
at =
c
a
ct +
inv
a
invt +
invoil
a
invoilt +
g
a
gt (A.23)
tt =
q
t
qt + f261
m
t
mt (A.24)
ct = slc
csp
c
cspt + (1  slc)
csa
c
csat (A.25)
yt =
a
y
at +
x
y
mt  
x
y
[mt + f291m

t + z
M
t ] (A.26)
Foreign block
yt = 
yyt 1 + "
y
t (A.27)
t = 
t 1 + "

t (A.28)
iq;t = 
iiq;t 1 + "
i
t (A.29)
mct = 
mcmct 1 + "
mc
t (A.30)
t = 
t 1 + "

t (A.31)
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Domestic shock processes
gt = 
Ggt 1 + "Gt (A.32)
invoilt = 
oilinvoilt 1 + "
oil
t (A.33)
Zt = 
ZZt 1 + "
Z
t (A.34)
zUt = 
UzUt 1 + "
U
t (A.35)
zinvt = 
invzinvt 1 + "
inv
t (A.36)
zMt = 
MzMt 1 + "
M
t (A.37)
zLt = 
LzLt 1 + "
L
t (A.38)
!t = 
!!t 1 + "!t (A.39)
zBt = 
BzBt 1 + "
B
t (A.40)
Ht = 
HHt 1 + "
H
t (A.41)
A.2 NAM
A.2.1 List of variables
All growth rates and interest rates except it are expressed in per cent.
yt output
pt consumer price index
vt nominal exchange rate, trade-weighted
zt producitivity (value added per man hour)
Trendt trend growth in productivity
ut unemployment rate, registered
wt nominal hourly wage costs
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gt government sector expenditure
T1t payroll tax rate
pot oil prices
pet electricity, fuel and lubricants prices in the CPI
lt nominal credit volume
Rt money market interest rate (3 month euro-krone interest rate)
it quarterly annualized domestic nominal interest rate (in basis points)
Rt foreign interest rate (ECU weighted e¤ective interest rate on foreign bonds)
RL;t average interest rate on bank loans
RB;t yield on six year government bonds, quarterly average
RB;t yield on long-term foreign bonds, NOK basket weighted
pt consumer prices abroad, in foreign currency
pit price deator of total imports
pit producer price index, trading partners
t year-on-year CPI ination rate
t year-on-year foreign CPI ination rate
A.2.2 Model
The following variables are held constant during simulations, but are included in the equations
below: pt , 

t , pot, pi

t , pet, T1t, Trendt, gt. In addition, all constants from the original model
specication are set equal to zero.
81
vt =  f11f(vt 1 + pt 1   pt 1) + f12[(Rt 1   t 1)  (Rt 1   t 1)]g (A.42)
 f13(Rt  Rt )  f142pot 1 + vt
pit =  f21[(pit 1   vt 1   pit 1)  f22(pt 1   vt 1   pt 1)] (A.43)
+f23vt + f25pi

t + 
pi
t
pt =  f31[pt 3   f32(wt 1   zt 1)  f33pit 1]  f34zt + f35pt 2 (A.44)
+f36pit + f37pet + f38yt 1 + 
p
t
wt =  f41[(wt 1   pt 2   zt 1) + f42ut 4] + f43pt + f44pt 1 (A.45)
 f45(2ut 1 + ut 3) + f46T1t + wt
zt =  f51[zt 3   f52(wt 1   pt 1)  f53Trendt   f54ut 2] (A.46)
+f55(wt   pt)  f562zt 1 + zt
ut =  f61fut 1   f62(wt 2   pt 2)  f63[(RL;t 2   t 2) (A.47)
 1004yt 2]g+ f64ut 1   f65ut 4   f66ut 5 + ut
yt =  f71[yt 2   f72gt 1   f73(vt 1 + pt 1   pt 1) (A.48)
+f74(RL;t 1   t 1)]  f75yt 1 + f76gt + f77(lt 1   pt 1)
+yt
(lt   pt) =  f81[(lt 3   pt 3)  f82yt 4 + f83(RL;t 4  RB;t 4)] (A.49)
+f842yt 2 + f852(wt   pt) + (l p)t
RL;t =  f91(RL;t 1   f92RB;t 1   f93Rt 1) + f94Rt + R;Lt (A.50)
RB;t =  f101(RB;t 1   f102Rt 1   f103RB;t 1) + f104Rt (A.51)
+f105R

t + 
R;B
t
it =
Rt
100
(A.52)
t =
pt   pt 4
pt 4
(A.53)
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A.3 LGM
A.3.1 List of variables
Ht quarterly annualized domestic goods ination (GDP deator)
Ft quarterly annualized imported goods ination
t quarterly annualized CPI ination
q;t quarterly CPI ination
yt output gap
 Ft law-of-one-price gap
st terms of trade
it quarterly annualized domestic nominal interest rate
iq;t quarterly domestic nominal interest rate
qt quarterly real exchange rate
iq;t quarterly foreign nominal interest rate
q;t quarterly foreign ination rate
yt foreign output gap
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A.3.2 Model
Ht = HEt 1
H
t+1 + (1  H)
4X
j=1
j
H
t j + yEt 1yt (A.54)
+ Et 1 
F
t + t
Ft = FEt 1
F
t+1 + (1  F )
4X
j=1
j
F
t j + ! Et 1 
F
t + t (A.55)
yt = yEt 1yt+1 + (1  y)(yt 1 + (1  )yt 2) (A.56)
 (it   EtHt+1) + &Et 1 Ft + Et 1yt + ut
qt = (1  )Etqt+1 + qt 1   (iq;t   Etq;t+1) + (iq;t   Etq;t+1) +  t (A.57)
 Ft = qt   (1  )st (A.58)
st  1
4
(Ft   Ht ) (A.59)
t = (1  )Ht + Ft (A.60)
q;t = 
q;t 1 + 

t (A.61)
iq;t = 
iiq;t 1 + 
i
t (A.62)
yt = 
yyt 1 + 
y
t (A.63)
it = 4iq;t (A.64)
t = 4q;t (A.65)
A.3.3 Estimation results
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Series Transformation Model Variable
GDP mainland Norway per
capita, seasonally adjusted
Log, HP-ltered
with  = 16000,
demeaned
yt
Quarterly core ination
(KPIJAE) Norway, season-
ally adjusted
Annualized, de-
meaned
Ht
Quarterly core ination im-
ported goods, seasonally ad-
justed
Annualized, de-
meaned
Ft
3-month nominal money
market interest rate Norway
(NIBOR)
Annualized, de-
meaned
it
Trade weighted real ex-
change rate
Log, HP-ltered
with  = 16000,
demeaned
qt
World output gap, season-
ally adjusted (from OECD)
Demeaned yt
3-month nominal money
market interest rate main
trading partners
Demeaned iq;t
Trade weighted quarterly
ination (KPI), seasonally
adjusted
Demeaned q;t
Table A.1: List of data series used for estimation of LGM.
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Parameter Prior distribution Prior
mean
Prior
st.dev.
Posterior
mean
Posterior 95% con-
dence interval
H Normal 0:58 0:2 0:6299 0:5548  0:7051
o Normal  0:39 0:2  0:4622  0:5025  0:4135
1 Normal 0:22 0:2 0:0953  0:0148  0:2255
2 Normal 0:72 0:2 0:7636 0:6829  0:8324
x Normal 0:28 0:1 0:1948 0:1608  0:2260
 Normal 0:04 0:02 0:0479 0:0415  0:0579
f Normal 0:78 0:2 0:6629 0:5962  0:7304
0 Normal 1:11 0:2 1:0900 1:0619  1:1263
1 Normal 0 0:2 0:0482  0:0372  0:1403
2 Normal 0 0:2 0:0419  0:0443  0:1265
!psi Normal 0:56 0:2 0:6198 0:5731  0:6617
x Normal 0:53 0:2 0:4037 0:3672  0:4459
 Normal 1:36 0:2 1:1618 1:1117  1:1968
 Normal 0:07 0:02 0:0800 0:0718  0:0900
& Normal 0:11 0:05 0:0506 0:0372  0:0636
 Normal 0:25 0:1 0:2113 0:1783  0:2510
 Beta 0:1 0:05 0:0740 0:0541  0:1024
 Beta 0:9 0:05 0:9749 0:9614  0:9939
 Beta 0:75 0:2 0:7055 0:6713  0:7350
 Normal 0:375 0:3 0:3848 0:3139  0:4568
y Normal 0:125 0:3 0:1988 0:1274  0:2556
i Inverse gamma 0:01 inf 0:0063 0:0054  0:0072
H Inverse gamma 0:02 inf 0:0132 0:0113  0:0150
F Inverse gamma 0:06 inf 0:0361 0:0302  0:0419
x Inverse gamma 0:004 inf 0:0078 0:0057  0:0101
q Inverse gamma 0:01 inf 0:0328 0:0280  0:0378
y Inverse gamma 0:004 inf 0:0047 0:0040  0:0053
 Inverse gamma 0:003 inf 0:0024 0:0021  0:0027
i Inverse gamma 0:001 inf 0:0011 0:0010  0:0013
Table A.2: Prior and posterior distributions for variables in the LGM model.
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Appendix B
Derivation of the implied ination
premium
Let the policy implemented in a given model change from the optimal implementable policy
roir to another policy rule rnew, and let the losses measured by the standard loss function 3.5
under these policies be, respectively, Loir and Lrule. Following Kuester and Wieland (2010),
the implied ination premium (IIP) measures the increase in the standard deviation of t (in
percentage points) when policy changes from roir to rnew that is required to increase the loss
to the new level Lrule while holding the standard deviations of yt and it constant. Let the
IIP be given by  = rule   oir . Then the new loss can be expressed in terms of the loss
under the optimal policy, the standard deviation of t under the optimal policy, and the IIP:
Lrule =
 
oir + 
2
+ y
2
y + i
2
i (B.1)
=
 
oir
2
+ y
2
y + i
2
i + ()
2 + 2oir 
= Loir + ()
2 + 2oir ;
where the standard deviations of yt andi are calculated under the optimal policy roir. From
this, we can easily solve for the IIP, . The positive solution to the second order equation
is given by
 =
p
Lrule   Loir + (oir )2   oir : (B.2)
This formula can be justied more intuitively by noting that the di¤erence in loss, holding
the variances/standard deviations of yt andit constant, is equal to the di¤erence in variance
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between the two rules,
Lrule   Loir = (rule )2   (oir )2: (B.3)
Solving this equation for rule and then subtracting 
oir
 on both sides will give equation B.2.
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Appendix C
Optimal implementable rules
The optimal implementable rules in each of the four models are given in table C.1. These
rules are of the following type:
it = 1it 1 + 2it 2 + ;0t + ;1t 1 + ;2t 2 + y;0yt + y;1yt 1 + y;2yt 2: (C.1)
Model 1 2 ;0 ;1 ;2 y;0 y;1 y;2
NEMO 1:8  0:82 1:0  1:2 0:32 0:27  0:035  0:20
Credit NEMO 1:9  0:89 1:5  1:9 0:64 0:40  0:15  0:20
LGM 1:6  0:68 0:84  0:85 0:31 0:85  0:48  0:10
NAM 0:37  0:15 1:24  0:22  0:22 0:30 0:24 0:0031
Table C.1: Optimal eight parameter rules in each of the four models.
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